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Degree of Master of Science
(in Spatial Information Science and Engineering)
August, 2006

Recent advancements in location tracking technologies have increased the threat
to an individual's personal privacy. Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology
allows for the identification and potentially continuous tracking of an object or
individual, without obtaining the individual's consent or even awareness that the tracking
is taking place. Although many positive applications for RFID technology exist, for
example in the commercial sector and law enforcement, the potential for abuse in the
collection and use of personal information through this technology also exists. Location
data linked to other types of personal information allows not only the detection of past
spatial travel and activity patterns, but also inferences regarding past and future behavior
and preferences. Legislative and technological solutions to deal with the increased
privacy threat raised by this and similar tracking technologies have been proposed. Such
approaches in isolation have significant limitations. This thesis hypothesizes that an
approach may be developed with high potential for sufficiently protecting individual

privacy in the use of RFID technologies while also strongly supporting marketplace uses
of such tags. The research develops and investigates the limits of approaches that might
be us,ed to protect privacy in pervasive RFID surveillance environments. The conclusion
is ultimately reached that an approach facilitating individual control over the linking of
unique RFID tag ID numbers to personal identity implemented though a combination of
legal controls and technological capabilities would be a highly desirable option in
balancing the interests of both the commercial sector and the information privacy
interests of individuals. The specific model developed is responsive to the core ethical
principle of autonomy of the individual and as such is also intended to be more
responsive to the needs of individual consumers. The technological approach proposed
integrated with enabling privacy legislation and private contract law to enable interactive
alteration of privacy preferences should result in marketplace solutions acceptable to both
potential commercial users and those being tracked.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the problem of privacy loss and provides motivation for
privacy protection in the use of location tracking technologies within RFID
environments. It states the goal of the research, which is to provide an alternative
approach to privacy protection that better comports with foundational ethical principles,
and provides an outline of the remaining thesis chapters.

1.1 Motivation
Technology is creeping into every aspect of our lives. There is a feeling that we
are losing control over our personal space, which was formerly considered private.
Surveillance technologies are watching and recording our every move - ATM machines,
traffic light cameras, security cameras at the office, mall, health club, supermarket,
parking garage, hotel, apartment building, street-scapes in business districts and many
other locations as we move through the day. Advancing technology lowers our
expectation of privacy and therefore as new technology is introduced we are less shocked
or surprised by its capabilities. Individuals are slowly becoming immune or desensitized
to privacy loss.
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies are likely to raise the
surveillance level to a new high, with the capability to reach into homes or other personal
spaces to share details of private activities. Comprehensive records of an individual's
movements could be generated through capture of the globally unique ID numbers from

RFID tags embedded in consumer goods worn by, carried by, or in close vicinity to the
individual throughout the day. The exploding RFID market will likely lead to the
embedding of RFID tags into most consumer goods (e.g., clothing, electronics, food
packaging and automobile parts), and implementation has already begun. RFID readers
are capable of capturing massive amounts of data from RFID tags, and with the soaring
demand for consumer data by private corporations, and the desire to access that data by
government entities for purposes such as national security, threats to personal privacy
continue to rise. In addition, RFID technology can be combined with other technologies
such as surveillance cameras, creating a potentially pervasive surveillance network that
enables personal identification and continuous tracking. This in turn could result in
enhanced detection of spatial and temporal patterns linked to specific individuals.
Linking tag ID numbers to an individual at the point of sale will facilitate the
capture of personally identifiable data by readers dispersed throughout the individual's
daily environment. Announcements regarding implementation of this technology by
government agencies and corporations such as Wal-Mart have led to growing controversy
and fear of personal tracking. Proposals to limit collection of tag data include an outright
ban on the technology or disabling RFID tags at the point of sale. However, many
recognize the multitude of beneficial applications offered by RFID technology to
consumers and businesses alike. This has led to recommendations of various methods to
ameliorate privacy protection, while promoting the utilization of RFID technology.
Researchers have explored both technological and legislative approaches to privacy
protection, but neither approach alone appears to provide a realistic or practical solution.
Technological approaches many times are germane only to certain applications areas and

may not be appropriate for others. The slow legislative process often does not keep pace
with rapid technological advancements, and therefore legislation may already be outdated
as it ,reaches adoption, while attempting passage of any type of privacy law may be a
challenge in itself. In addition, U.S. privacy legislation is often reactionary, created in
response to a specific privacy threat or violation, and applied on an ad hoc basis. Further,
when laws are passed they typically are applied in a one-size-fits-all approach. Since
technological and legislative approaches applied separately are limited in their success, a
solution incorporating both approaches may prove more effectual (Taipale 2004) and
may be more efficient in responding to the privacy and service needs of each user.
Although some RFID systems may have security measures blocking access to tag
data by unauthorized readers, currently many do not, and the assumption is that this will
hold true for the future as well. For item level tagging to be achieved, the cost of tags
would need to drop into the five to ten cent range. Currently, cheap tags do not possess
much computational capability, and cannot support many proposed security measures.
Therefore, at least initially, RFID may be a fairly open system, so that anyone with a
reader will be able to access data from most RFID-tagged consumer products, absent
security measures. Further, tags that can be universally read regardless of where or from
whom the item was purchased or borrowed will be of greatest utility to consumers and
thus to a mature marketplace.

1.2 Research Goal and Hypothesis
The goal of this thesis is to develop and describe a model that protects personal
privacy by facilitating individual control over personal information collection and use
within RFID observation environments, while affording substantial support to
marketplace uses of RFID technology. To accomplish this goal, specific questions need
to be addressed, including the following:
What is the minimum standard of privacy protection that would prove acceptable
to the general populace and how could technology be used to enforce that level of
protection?
How might purchasers of WID-tagged items be afforded control over the amount
and nature of personal or location information that may be obtained through the
recording and tracking of their tags by RFID readers?
How could unauthorized linking of RFID tag data to individual identities be
prevented?
Since a multitude of consumer RFID applications are envisioned for the future,
how might privacy be enabled in a way that permits continued tag usability after
the purchase of RFID-tagged goods?
How might consumer privacy protection be facilitated, while at the same time not
hindering the growth of useful RFID applications and the RFID market?

The hypothesis of this thesis is as follows:
A combined legal and technological approach may be developed with high
potential for suficiently protecting individual privacy in the use of RFID
technologies while also strongly supporting marketplace uses of such tags.

1.3 Scope of Thesis and Methods Employed
This thesis explores various legal and technological approaches to privacy
protection within pervasive RFID environments. It presents a conceptual model that
attempts to balance personal information privacy and marketplace needs and analyzes

issues that are likely to arise during the design and implementation phases. This thesis
does not include an actual implementation of the model since such would require
legislative and institutional actions, as well as technological development.
Research began with an examination of past and current proposals for
technological and legislative solutions to personal information and location privacy
protection, in order to determine whether any of these proposals could be applied in a
RFID environment. Proposals for WID-specific legislation, guidelines and technology to
protect privacy were then considered. So as to gain a global perspective, rather than
merely a United States perspective on privacy and RFID technology, minimum legal
standards and RFID technology deployment in various countries were considered. After
investigation of other proposed solutions and reflection on the questions outlined in
section 1.2, the results were incorporated into a design that appears to provide consumers
with an acceptable level of privacy enabling individual choice and that supports
marketplace applications and growth.
Since it is impossible to know for certain how RFID technology will develop and
what future RFID environments will be like, it is necessary to make some assumptions in
these regards. This research assumes that:
Passive RFID tags (i.e. lacking their own power source) will be embedded
in most, if not all, consumer products or packaging;
RFID readers will be dispersed throughout the daily environment;
Linking of RFID tag data to individual identity will be possible;
RFID systems will be interoperable, functioning under common
standards, so that a tag could be tracked continuously, even from one
country to another; and

RFID technology will continue to be a fairly open system, so that any
RFID reader can access data from most passive RFID tags.

1.4 Thesis Outline

The remainder of this thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter 2
defines privacy and discusses general privacy principles and issues, and then focuses on
issues relating to location-based privacy. This chapter covers past and current approaches
to personal information privacy protection, both in the legal and technological aspects, as
well as the key differences between U.S. and European approaches to privacy and
privacy protection. Chapter 3 introduces RFID technology

- the

components of an RFID

system, the operation of an RFID system, and current user applications for RFID
technology. Additionally, Chapter 3 examines future predicted and conceivable
applications of RFID. Chapter 4 outlines privacy issues arising from the use of RFID
technology and discusses what makes WID-related privacy issues different from those of
other technologies. Specific privacy concerns raised through current uses of RFID
technology and potential future applications are also addressed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5
specifically focuses on proposed or attempted legal and technological approaches to
protecting location privacy. The benefits and shortcomings of the alternatives are
analyzed. This chapter also discusses why a combined approach incorporating into its
design a contractual relationship between data collectors and data subjects, along with
technology to enforce the agreed upon contract, may offer the best solution. Chapter 6
presents a model that allows consumers to "opt-out" of the linking of tags in purchased
items to other personally identifiable information through registration on a centralized
list, supported by privacy legislation. An individual's ability to "opt-in" at specific times

enabled through private contract law is also discussed, along with the techno10,gy
required to implement the model. Legal and teclmological issues arising from the
implementation of this model are also addressed. Lastly, Chapter 7 provides a summary
and conclusions of the research conducted. A final section in Chapter 7 suggests areas for
future work.

Chapter 2
PRIVACY

Before the modern technological era of surveillance cameras and the constant
recording of an individual's transactions, communications and movements, events
witnessed or statements overheard many times remained only as long as the memory of
the individuals involved. Now with the advent of email, communications can be sent
instantaneously and recorded indefinitely. An item posted on a website is available for
the whole world to see and may be archived long into the future. Video clips can be
played over and over again. The lives of even average people are now subject to constant
scrutiny. The future promises even more scrutiny, as it is estimated that "by 2023 large
organizations will be able to devote the equivalent of a contemporary PC to monitoring
every single one of the 330 million people who will then be living in the United States
(Farmer and Mann 2003)." With the potential for advances of this caliber in surveillance
technology and other technologies that allows the extraction and analyzing of personal
data, developing methods of protecting privacy becomes not only urgent, but paramount
as well.

2.1 Privacy: Principles and Issues
Privacy is a difficult concept to define, with views on privacy varying greatly.
Some view the loss of privacy and public anonymity as a potential form of social control
and that "if current trends in technology development continue, then everyone in the
country soon might find themselves back in the equivalent of a small town," where

everyone is constantly aware of everyone else's actions (Morgan and Newton 2004).
Others maintain we are more likely to see a "big brother" or "panopticon" information
environment where the many are observed in great detail by a corporate and law
enforcement elite. In order to feel secure there must be protections from potential
physical or monetary threats and criminal activities. To provide that security, the
argument is made that law enforcement must collect information on its citizens, which in
turn threatens the privacy of those citizens (Solove and Rotenberg 2003). Although total
privacy or anonymity is not possible in today's world, a balance between these and other
"legitimate social objectives" is important, with legal oversight provided (Morgan and
Newton 2004). Regardless of the many viewpoints held on the degree of privacy or
surveillance that should be allowed, prior to an individual's decision to relinquish some
degree of privacy, there is a need to understand the potential consequences of that
decision.

2.1.1 Privacy as a Right
Although privacy as a concept may differ from one country to another, people
generally hold privacy as a right. Europeans tend to look at privacy as a basic human
right and a matter of human dignity, enacting legislation setting minimum standards to
protect the privacy of individuals. The United States holds privacy as a right under the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. While the plain language of the Fourth
Amendment restricts only government invasions of privacy, "unreasonable searches and
seizures" without "probable cause," this constitutional right has been expanded by the
courts over time in the context of other constitutional language (Onsrud et al. 1994). By

example, the constitutional right of privacy also prevents intrusions by private individuals
or corporations, "...into one's private activities, in such a manner as to cause mental
suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities" (Shorter v. Retail
Credit Co.). When determining whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a particular
situation, consideration is given to the 'reasonable expectation of privacy test' articulated
by Justice Harlan (Katz v. United States 1967). Both requirements of the test must be
satisfied for application

-

1) that an individual "exhibited an actual (subjective)

expectation of privacy" and that 2) "the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable' (Solove and Rotenberg 2003)." Rosen (2004) suggests this test
is of a circular nature, in that, "people's subjective expectations of privacy reflect the
privacy they subjectively experience, and as electronic surveillance in public became
more intrusive and more pervasive, it lowered people's objective expectation of privacy
as well, with a corresponding diminution of constitutional protections."
Warren and Brandeis (1 890) argued for the establishment of privacy as a general
right to be defended in the courts, defining privacy as "the right to be let alone." Others
have defined privacy "as a right of personhood, intimacy, secrecy, limited access to the
self, and control over information (Solove and Rotenberg 2003)." Philosophers such as
Kant have argued that a major aspect of personhood is the ability of an individual to be
"autonomous" or "self-determining (Spinello 2003)." Unless individuals have the ability
to control the amount and type of personal information being collected, stored and
released, they cannot be considered autonomous. A person has autonomy in shaping his
own life when he is able to make informed decisions based on his own preferences and
desires rather than being forced to choose from within the confines of explicit or implied

parameters, constructed by others who define what is considered acceptable behavior.
The ability to readily determine what information is being collected, when this is
occurring, how it is being accomplished, and for what purpose, is a prerequisite for each
individual in making informed decisions relating to the control and flow of their personal
information.

2.1.2 Differing Perspectives

Views on privacy, whether in the U.S. or other countries, vary between or even
within groups - whether governmental, business, or private citizen - as these entities have
differing opinions on the value of or need for privacy. For instance, a U.S. business that
wants to obtain records of an individual's buying habits for marketing purposes does not
have much incentive to protect that individual's personal information except to the extent
that its own privacy practices harm its potential market. If the business can better target a
consumer's needs and desires, their profit potentially increases. The government trying to
protect its citizens from threats of terrorism may feel the need and right to collect
personal information. A citizen, however, if given a choice in the matter, may be
reluctant to provide personal information for any of these purposes, concerned about
future uses of the information that has been collected. The initial purpose for collection
may be agreeable to the citizen, such as transaction data recorded at the time of a credit
card purchase. However, once that information is stored within a database and merged
with other data, the potential exists for additional unintended uses. The now defunct Total
Information Awareness (TIA) data mining program would have allowed the federal
government to collect, merge, and analyze vast amounts of personal data on citizens of

the United States. Another recently terminated (ACLU 2005) database surveillance
program, the Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information exchange (MATRIX), had been
operating in a number of states with funding and oversight by the Department of
Homeland Security. This program created profiles through data merged from government
and private databases, allowing law enforcement searches for terrorist activities or other
crimes (ACLU 2003). These government data mining activities to search through all
citizens' personal information "run the risk of becoming the 2lst-century equivalent of
general searches, which the authors of the Bill of Rights were so concerned to protect
against (Kumagai and Cherry 2004)."
The problem, according to Sobel of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, is
that "once information exists, it's virtually impossible to limit its use." (Kumagai and
Cherry 2004) The amount of personal information available is huge as illustrated by
ChoicePoint, one current private data warehouse that contains more than 10 billion
records gathered by marketers, credit card bureaus, and private detectives (Rosen 2004).
In a recent visible case, tens of thousands of individuals in California had their credit
information transferred by ChoicePoint to illicit companies. Until recently, California
was the only state to require companies like ChoicePoint to divulge when they know such
activities have occurred. Further, the accuracy of large customer databases has been
called into question; with one estimate claiming 20-35 percent of records in many of
those large databases contain one or more major errors or omissions (Farmer and Mann
2003).

2.1.3 Assessing the Risks and Benefits
Schilit et al. (2003) describe privacy as "a malleable concept based on societal
perceptions of risk and benefit." Immediately following 911 1, perceptions of risk from
potential terrorist acts increased immensely and therefore individuals were more willing
to exchange some of their privacy for a perception of greater security. This was attested
to by passage of the USA PATRIOT Act a mere six weeks after the attacks of 911 1,
following little debate or revision within the House or Senate (EPIC 2004d). In the post
911 1 world, "citizens also face increasing pressure to expose personal information, in
order to prove that they have nothing to hide (Rosen 2004)."
In order to weigh the risks and benefits associated with a given situation or a
technology being employed, one must understand the issues involved. In a study
conducted by Beckwith and Lederer (Beckwith 2003) at an eldercare facility supporting a
"sensor-rich environment," residents, their family members, and the staff and managers
were interviewed and observed to determine their views and perceptions of the sensor
technology in their surrounding environment. Sensor technology included in the study
were motion detectors, load cells on beds, sensors to determine if doors were open or
closed, and electronic badges worn by staff and residents that allowed their location to be
constantly tracked and recorded. Beckwith (2003) found that the individuals involved
often were not aware of the technology's capabilities or the extent of the data being
collected, and often forgot any monitoring was occurring. Although some of the data
collected could be considered "sensitive," the study "found that people's lack of
understanding of the technology rendered them unable to judge (Beckwith 2003)."

Without a clear understanding of what potential issues may arise as the result of a
particular decision, informed consent to relinquishment of privacy is not possible.

2.2 Past and Current Approaches to Personal Information Privacy Protection
Differing perspectives on privacy make it difficult to come to any sort of
consensus as to how best to protect personal information privacy. Privacy International, a
watchdog group, suggests four current models of privacy protection, with countries often
implementing combinations of these models (White 2003):

I.

Comprehensive laws that regulate the "collection, use, and dissemination
of personal information, by both the government and private sector," such
as the European Union (EU) Data Directives;

2.

Sectoral laws that provide regulations for specific areas like videocassette
rentals and medical privacy, such as those found in the U.S.;

3.

Self-regulation, encouraging companies or industry groups to adopt their
own guidelines on "self-regulation" and engage in "self-policing", an
approach used in the U.S.; and

4.

Technology, making use of techniques such as encryption, anonymous
remailers, proxy servers, and digital payment methods.

This section outlines the implementation of some of these methods in both the past and
present.

2.2.1 Legal Approaches
Article 12 of the L N Declaration on Human Rights (1943) provided the first
international recognition of privacy as a basic huinan right. Over the years, this
agreement "has acquired the force of law through its incorporation into national laws, and
because its language and ideas have been included in subsequent, binding treaties on
human rights (Rotenberg 2003)." The need for privacy protection was also recognized in
the U.S. Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare (HEW) Report (1973), which
highlighted concerns relating to governmental use of personal information. The report
recommended establishment of the Code of Fair Information Practices, to apply to
government records contained in computer databases. Recommendations included
principles like notice, access, use limitation, accuracy, and security, principles similar to
those recommended in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Privacy Guidelines of 1980, which promoted the setting of minimum standards
(Solove and Rotenberg 2003; Onsrud et al. 1994).
A general privacy law approach has been followed by the European Union, with
implementation of the European Union Data Protection Directives of 1995, 1997, and
2002. EU Directive 95/46/EC regulates the processing of personal data and the
movement of that data, limiting data transfer to EU countries or those with equal levels of
privacy. The 1997 and 2002 directives are seen as "add-ons", developed to keep pace
with new technology. The EU Directive 97/66/EC additionally protects personal privacy
within the telecommunications sector, and EU Directive 2002/58/EC specifically covers
privacy protection within the electronic communications sector. These EU Directives
follow an "opt-in" requirement, in which the user must give explicit consent to have his

information collected (Zevenbergen 2004; Myles et al. 2003). Many of the postCommunist countries follow the European lead and explicitly grant data protection within
their constitutions. The European approach to privacy law places the emphasis on
protecting personal information from third-party users, with the EU Directives applying
in the business arena, as well as to government (White 2003). While often advocated in
the U.S., one should note that an "opt-in" approach has been held by the federal judiciary
to-date as a violation of corporate "free speech under the U.S. Constitution (U.S. West,
Inc. v. FCC 1999). This suggests that alternatives to blanket laws need to be considered
in the U.S. context.
Privacy law in the United States focuses mainly on protecting individuals from
governmental abuses of privacy. There is a tendency to steer clear of regulating privacy
within the marketplace. Rather than general across-the-board privacy regulations, U.S.
law instead provides "scattershot" protection of information privacy, applying to specific
areas (White 2003). Examples of major privacy laws in the U.S. include: the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (1970), protecting individuals against misuse of personal information by
credit reporting agencies; the Privacy Act (1974), which provides guidelines for federal
agencies regarding the use and disclosure of personal information of citizens and
provides citizens with access to their own files; and the Financial Services Modernization
Act (1999), requiring financial institutions to provide consumers with a notice of the
institutions' privacy practices and the right to "opt-out" of the sale of their personal
information to third parties (Rotenberg 2003). According to Monmonier (2002), the
Financial Services Modernization Act provides ". ..consumers and investors limited
rights to control their data," however, "its opt-out procedures are arcane, inconsistent, and

unable to guarantee the confidentiality most of us crave," and he supports instead ".,.an
opt-in requirement whereby no one can sell or trade our records without our explicit
penyission."

2.2.2 Technological Approaches
Various methods have been employed to protect the confidentiality of individuals
while performing analysis of database records to extract useful information. One such
area of concern is dealing with health records, especially when performing
geographically-based analysis. Past approaches have involved aggregating all records for
a geographical area of a specified population, which restricts the usefulness of analysis
results. Armstrong et al. (1999) proposed instead to apply geographical masks to
individual health events, allowing valuable analyses to be performed, while protecting the
privacy and confidentiality of the individual records. Another approach for protecting
information in databases is proposed by Latanya Sweeney of Carnegie Mellon
University, who is developing privacy enhancing software using a "k-anonymity" model,
in which "each individual record is minimally generalized so that it indistinctly maps to
at least k individuals (Morgan and Newton 2004)." Sweeney's privacy-enhancing
software might return query results of only the first three digits of a zip code or just the
birth year, rather than the exact date (Kumagai and Cherry 2004).
Other researchers have endeavored to design filters for databases that protect the
confidentiality of contained records. Teresa Lunt is designing a "privacy appliance" to
restrict the in flow and out flow of database information that would permit identification,

short of a court order. The device also generates log files and audit trails to trace intruders
(Kumagai and Cherry 2004).
A number of Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETS) have also been developed
to protect personal information by controlling the amount of information released during
on-line transactions or communications. Encryption is one type of PET in which data is
scrambled or transformed into an unreadable format, and can only be unscrambled with a
decryption key available to authorized users. Two common types of key encryption
systems are symmetric-key and public-key systems. With the symmetric-key system the
same key is used for both encryption and decryption. Public-key cryptography makes use
of two separate keys

-

a public-key and a private-key. Data encryption is accomplished

through use of the data recipient's public-key, which may be published in an online
directory. Only the private-key can decrypt the message. Steganography can be used
along with encryption to hide encrypted identifiers or other data in bits within the
message (National Research Council 2000; Senicar et al. 2003). Using a key generator
like public-key cryptography, and then adding a signing and verification function, a
digital signature can be created. When a key pair is generated, a user can input the secret
key and a digital object into the signing function. This produces a signature, or set of bits,
as output. The object, the signature, and the signer's public key are then fed into the
verification function to access the data (National Research Council 2000).
Anonymization is another example of PET. Anonymization involves assigning a
pseudonym or alias, creating a unique ID, so that a user is not identified, during web
browsing for example (Senicar et al. 2003).

2.2.3 Policy Approach
The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P), developed by the World
Wide Web Consortium (W3C), follows more of a policy approach to privacy protection,
relying "on social and legal pressures to compel organizations to comply with their stated
policies (Myles et al. 2003)." P3P allows Web users to designate their own privacy
preferences and then compares those preferences to the privacy policies of websites they
visit. This comparison is carried out automatically through a web browser. (P3P 2003) If
policies of a website do not match the privacy preferences of the user, then the browser
will inform the user, who can then decide whether or not to enter that website. While a
huge amount of time and effort by industry and others have gone into developing this
approach, its widespread adoption and use has yet to occur.

2.3 Location-Based Privacy
Recent advances in technology have greatly enhanced surveillance capabilities.
With the proliferation of surveillance cameras, an estimated 26 million in use worldwide
and 11 million of those within the U.S., along with other technologies allowing electronic
toll payments and ATM or credit card transaction recording, it is nearly impossible to
move throughout the day without being picked up by one or more of these sensors. As an
example, it is estimated that in London an average individual's image is captured by
more than 300 cameras every day (Farmer and Mann 2003). By 2005, an FCC mandate
requires wireless carriers to provide the location of cellular phone users in the U.S. to
within a few hundred feet (White 2003). While current technology in the commercial
sector is not yet coordinated sufficiently to allow for the automated tracking of

individuals, this could easily change with the ever-evolving and newly emerging
technologies. This expanding ability to track the movements of average citizens has led to
increasing concern over protecting information that relates to an individual's specific
location and the desire to obtain more control over release of such information.

2.3.1 Defining Location Privacy

In order to understand the issues involved in location privacy, it is necessary to
understand exactly what location privacy is and how it varies from other types of privacy
issues. Beresford and Stajano (2003) define location privacy as "the ability to prevent
other parties from learning one's current or past location." White (2003) lists a series of
three processes that distinguish location privacy issues from other types of privacy issues
-

location identzfication, data processing, and value-added use. In the first process,

location technologies provide identification of an individual and the determination of her
location. In the second process, the location information collected is stored so as to allow
processing. In the third process, there is a current or potential "value-added use for the
collected location information, although these "value-added" uses are often not foreseen.

2.3.2 Concerns Relating to Location Privacy

The importance of location privacy increases as location-tracking technologies
gain greater accuracy in their locating capabilities. For example, an individual may not be
concerned if he can be tracked and located to within 1000 meters, but once his location
can be determined to within 10 meters his concern may grow. As of May of 2000 when
the U.S. government turned off selective availability, even the most inexpensive GPS

receivers can determine location coordinates to within a range of 3-10 meters, provided
the signal is not blocked by obstacles such as buildings or hilly terrain. As GPS
technology and other location-tracking technologies continue to progress, pinpointing
locations will become more and more accurate.
Along with advances in locating technologies, computing capabilities are
constantly expanding. According to Moore's law, processor speed roughly doubles every
18 months. Hard drive capacity has doubled each year over the last decade (Farmer and
Mann 2003). As computing capabilities improve, the potential severity of the
consequences resulting from privacy abuse by means of location-tracking technologies
also grows. Greater storage capacity allows for retention of more data and greater
processing capabilities can provide faster and more in-depth data analysis.
In addition to concerns relating to the collection of very accurate location data are
the concerns raised through the potential linking of that location data with other types of
personal information. One location-based service (LBS) user may find the advertisement
for a discount on leather jackets received as she passes a clothing store to be an
annoyance, while others may be glad to receive discount offers reflecting their
purchasing preferences. Although in this instance the linking of personal location and
purchase profile data has resulted in an annoyance at most, the linking of other types of
personal information to location data could prove more harmful. If an individual were
continuously tracked, that individual's location could be determined at any given time.
Additionally, if this data was collected over time, it might be fairly easy to infer where an
individual would be located at a given time on a specific day. An unauthorized person
gaining access to the data or an unscrupulous person having access may decide to misuse

the data to cause harm to the individual being tracked, linking the location data to other
personal data such as home address and recent purchases.
,

As is often the case, there are costs involved in the use of new technologies. The

use of wireless communication devices involves tradeoffs. Users are generally free to
communicate from whatever location they choose. However, "that freedom from a
particular location has a cost

-

the possibility that one must give up the ability to

communicate from any location without disclosing that location to the wireless provider,
allowing processing of that location information and further downstream uses (White

2003)." With that disclosure of location may come another cost - vulnerability to stalkers
or others wishing to cause harm.

Chapter 3

RFID TECHNOLOGY

Although Radio Frequency Identification technology has become a hot topic of
late, with current use becoming more widespread not only within industry but many other
fields as well, it is not a new technology. RFID has been in use since World War I1 at
least, when in 1940 the Royal Air Force implemented the "Identification Friend or Foe"
system in which transponders placed on their aircraft would respond to signals,
differentiating RAF from enemy aircraft (Royal Air Force 2003; Weis 2003). Since that
time utilization of RFID technology has expanded to include numerous applications, from
identifying and tracking lost pets to preventing theft of retail store goods and library
books. Many novel uses of the technology are also being envisioned for the future.

3.1 Components
An RFID system generally includes three main components: an W I D tag, or
transponder; an RFID reader or transceiver; and a "back-end" database. The RFID tag
may contain "object identifying data," such as the brand, manufacturer, and model, along
with a unique ID or serial number in the case of a product tag. The reader communicates
with or interrogates the tag, having the ability to read and write tag data, depending upon
the type and existence of a microchip within the tag. The database stores information
received through the tag and related to the tag ID number (Weis 2003).

3.1.1 W I D Tags
Most W I D tags are made up of two basic parts - a microchip, permitting an ID
number and possibly other data to be stored within the tag, and a means of
communication such as an antenna coil or another type of coupling element (Weis 2003).
The unique ID number of a tag has the ability to differentiate the tagged item fiom any
other item, even one of the same brand and style.
Tags may be classified by their power source or by the types of functions they are
able to perform. The three classifications by power source are passive, semi-passive and
active tags. Passive tags do not contain their own power source and therefore must rely
on the reader for activation and power. Power is supplied to the semi-passive tags
through a battery, but the tag can only respond to signals received from the reader. Active
tags also contain a battery as a power source, but in addition to receiving signals, the tags
are able to trigger communication with the reader as well (Weis 2003).
Weis (2003) groups tags into five classifications by the functions performed,
those classifications being similar to ones outlined by the MIT Auto-ID Center. Weis'
five classes are ranked from 0 to 4 with Class 0 being the simplest tag. No unique
identifier is found within Class 0 tags and these tags provide only electronic article

surveillance (EAS), making their presence known to a reader. Class 1 tags, generally
passive tags, contain a unique identifier. Tag memory is read-only or write-once readmany. Class 2 tags have data logging capability, with read-write memory. Typically these
are semi-passive or active tags. Tags within Class 3 integrate environmental sensors that
may record a feature such as temperature or monitor motion. These tags are semi-passive
or active. Class 4 tags are active tags and able to communicate with other tags by creating

"ad hoc wireless networks." The main focus of this thesis is on Class 1 tags, passive tags
containing a unique identifier.

3.1.2 RFID Readers
Normally a reader will initiate communication with a tag by transmitting a signal
that is received by the tag when it comes within read range, the distance within which a
reader is able to communicate with the tag. Read range of passive tags is typically up to 3
my depending on such variables as the tag frequency and the RFID system being used
(Psion Teklogix Inc. 2004), and newer technology is enabling longer read ranges. For
passive tags the reader must supply power to the tag. This is accomplished either by "farfield energy harvesting" of a reader's signal or inductive coupling. For the latter, the
magnetic field created by the reader causes an electric current to pass through a coupling
element that powers the capacitor (Weis 2003).
Communication between a passive tag and a reader can be accomplished by one
of two methods. In the 'reader talks first' method, tags are activated by the reader, but do
not reply without a specific request from the reader. By applying 'tree walking'
algorithms, for instance, the reader is able to specify a certain tag, rather than
interrogating every tag within range. With the 'tag talks first' method of communication,
transmission of data by the tags begins upon crossing the read range threshold,
facilitating the tracking of swiftly paced objects (Asif and Mandviwalla 2005).

3.1.3 Databases
The real usefulness of a tag derives from the ability to store its related data, such
as product or location information. A database contains information only as current as its
last entry, generally the "moment of last human intervention (Weis 2003)." When RFID
readers are linked to a database, that database can provide more than just a "snapshot"
regarding a tag's last location, for example. It can supply an automated and continuously
updated record of details associated with the tag, replacing the snapshot with "live video
(Weis 2003)."

3.2 Enhanced Capabilities of RFID over Barcodes
RFID technology provides a number of advantages over optical barcode
technology, leading to increased benefits for users of RFID systems. For instance,
although the Universal Product Code (UPC), adopted as the standard industry barcode,
contains the manufacture and product codes of an item, unlike RFID tags, it is unable to
provide a unique identifier. Therefore, that particular item cannot be distinguished from
another item of the same brand and style.
Additionally, when using optical barcodes is the necessary for proper alignment
with the barcode scanner in order for the code to be read. If the barcode becomes
distorted, or is covered in plastic wrapping, there is more potential for limited functioning
of the scanner (Weis 2003). RFID readers, on the other hand, do not require line of sight
to communicate with the tags and are able to automatically read up to several hundred
tags per second at a distance of 3m or more for many systems (Weis 2003; Psion
Teklogix 2004). Tags can be read through packaging such as cardboard, plastic, or paint,

allowing more flexibility in tag placement, and greater protection from harsh conditions
or tampering (Psion Teklogix 2004). A W I D reader could easily determine the number
of ,product packages located on a pallet, rather than having to scan the packages
individually, thus providing greater efficiency and lowering labor costs (Weis 2003;
Psion Teklogix 2004).
Currently there is the capability for W I D tags to be read by the various
independently operating parties within the supply chain, perhaps using incompatible
W I D systems. However, if a standardized RFID system were to exist, with each party in
a product's lifespan

-

from manufacturer to waste disposal or recycling company

-

providing data to a comprehensive database as the product moved through each phase,
then a complete history of the product could be logged. This would allow greater
oversight by regulatory agencies such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
providing protections relating to prescription drugs or perishable food products (Weis
2003; Psion Teklogix 2004). In addition, cost savings for managing supply chains and
retailer inventories could lead to substantial savings for consumers (Weis 2003). ROIWatch estimates initial savings to Wal-Mart for RFID implementation of: $6.7 billion in
decreased labor costs; $600 million in reduced costs relating to out-of-stock supply chain;
$575 million in decreased theft; $300 million through improved tracking within
warehouses and distribution centers; and $180 million relating to inventory holding and
carrying costs (Asif and Mandviwalla 2005).

3.3 Current Applications
Applications of RFID technology can generally be placed into one of three
categories

-

point-of-sale, closed loop, or open system. Point-of-sale applications are

those involving automatic fast payment for goods such as gasoline or electronic toll
collection systems. Closed loop applications are "standalone" solutions, overseen by only
one owner. These could include applications in healthcare, animal tracking, or
manufacturing processes, for example. Open systems would allow different entities, such
as the manufacturer, the transportation provider, and the retailer of a particular product to
make use of the same system. Open systems have been slower in arrival, since there is
no universal standard for RFID technology at this time (Psion Teklogix 2004). However,
widespread access to the data on many passive RFID tags may still be possible, since the
tags are often not encrypted (Newitz 2006).

3.3.1 Point-of-Sale Applications
These applications have become increasingly popular as individuals strive to
speed up transaction time and ease. ExxonMobil Speedpass allows customers to pay for
gasoline with a wave of their ID encoded key fob over the RFID reader. More states are
now implementing electronic toll collection systems, such as E-Zpass and FasTrak,
allowing drivers whose vehicles are mounted with a transponder to simply drive through
toll plazas (Psion Teklogix 2004; Dipert 2004).

3.3.2 Closed Loop Applications
The largest utilization of RFID technology within closed loop systems is in the
tracking or locating of objects or individuals. Groups as diverse as librarians and
nightclub owners are seeing the potential of RFID to increase profits and/or efficiency,
while providing more consumer payment or checkout choices. RFID has been used
within the commercial sector for years in the removable theft detection devices attached
to clothing or other items in many retail stores. Now those clunky devices can be replaced
with smaller, less conspicuous tags that will sound an alarm if an item is removed from
the store before purchase. Manufacturers are using RFID to follow products through the
manufacturing process and retailers are keeping a closer eye on their inventory, whether
tires or shampoo bottles.
Hospitals and nursing homes are also joining the RFID bandwagon. Several
Boston area hospitals are experimenting with RFID to track equipment as well as
surgeons, so that both can be located quickly in an emergency. Patients at Massachusetts
General Hospital are tagged, along with their medications. If a drug enters the room of an
allergic patient, or a patient has waited more than an allotted time between tests, staff
pagers will be alerted (Berdik 2005). Nursing homes are finding RFID tags helpful in
locating wandering Alzheimer's patients.
Pet owners have been using embedded RFID tags for years to locate lost pets.
Fifty million pets have been tagged worldwide. Livestock tagging has reached twenty
million worldwide (Psion Teklogix 2004). This became more popular after the Mad Cow
Disease scares, in order to trace the history of the animals. The newest in RFID cows tags
are ruminary tags, which can be swallowed by a cow and then reside in its stomach

(Transponder News). Implantable RFID devices are no longer limited to pets - people are
choosing to become "chipped" as well. Beach club patrons in Barcelona can pay for food
and drinks electronically using their subdermally embedded tags. One hundred sixty
government employees at the anticrime information center in Mexico City, along with the
Attorney General, have been tagged with Verichip devices. Some individuals in South
America have elected to go through the chipping process in response to increasing
occurrences of "flash kidnapping." In addition, medical records can be linked to the ID
number of a subdermal tag, allowing even unconscious individuals the ability to provide
health information to medical personnel (Dipert 2004).
Many other individuals are being tracked in the course of everyday life.
Businesses are tracing employee movements through use of RFID badges or cards, and
limiting access to certain areas. Primary schools in Japan are placing RFID tags on
clothing, bags, and nametags to locate students. In 2004 the shoes of Olympic Marathon
and Boston Marathon runners were fitted with RFID tags, allowing readers along the
racecourse to track the runners' locations, helping to prevent fraud (Dipert 2004).
Other items tracked through RFID include library books and airline luggage. Over
130 libraries in the U.S. are finding RFID technology useful in managing their
collections. In addition to locating books, RFID could provide the ability for library
patrons to checkout their own materials, not only speeding up the process for patrons, but
also lessening librarian duties (Bender 2005). The Vatican Library has implemented
RFID tags in the management of its extensive collection of 2 million books and other
treasures. Delta Airlines is implementing a luggage-tracking pilot along one route, with
plans to expand to other routes in the future (Dipert 2004).

These are but a few of the many applications currently being employed throughout
industry, healthcare, government, entertainment, and various other arenas. The potential
exi,sts for much greater implementation of RFID in the future, with widespread adoption
of current applications and those yet to come.

3.4 Predicted or Conceivable Applications
Future applications of RFID technology can be approached from two different
perspectives. The first is a tag-based perspective in which consideration is given to the
items to which a tag can be affixed, the information that will be linked to the tag and
what opportunities that will provide. The second is to think about applications within a
pervasive W I D reader environment - where the readers could be located and how this
might change peoples' everyday lives.

3.4.1 Tag-based Perspective
The slant of current applications is more towards a tag-based perspective rather
than a reader-based one. The majority of these current applications focus mainly on
locating and tracking an object, animal or person, rather than focusing on the recording of
large amounts of data about the subject of the tracking. This focus likely will shift
somewhat in the future. Although locating and tracking will remain a large part of the
RFID market, the growing amount of data that can be collected through and linked with
the tags will become increasingly significant.
The general movement is towards the integration of RFID tags into every
conceivable item and/or item packaging. Many consumer products could soon contain a

tag - home furnishings, food products, clothing, and accessories. Products could be
tracked from creation to destruction, providing a wealth of information for marketing
purposes, not to mention the ability to continuously track the individual wearing or using
the products.
One predicted use of RFID tags is for authentication of products. With the
proliferation of pricier brand name item "knock-offs", the ability to distinguish "knockoffs" from originals becomes more pertinent. Also, if a tag affixed to a purchased item
had the capability of being linked to recorded purchase data, it would be simple for a
retailer to determine purchase price and date, were the item to be returned for a refund. In
another example, to ensure only approved engine and aircraft parts are used in aircraft
construction, Boeing and Airbus are requiring their parts suppliers to attach tags to the
parts, providing data on part numbers along with pricing information (Dipert 2004).
US Government plans for W I D technology include embedding RFID chips into
e-passports. This would allow border agents to retrieve and then view the data on the tag
- the bearer's name, place and date of birth, as well as a digital photograph. Using facial

recognition software, a comparison between the traveler and the digital photograph could
be made. Citizens of the 27 countries from whom the US does not require travel visas
will need to carry e-passports as well. A prior deadline for compliance has not been met
by most of these countries, leading to an extension of the deadline. Originally, no
encryption techniques were to be employed to protect the data on e-passports. Security
issues were to be addressed through use of write-once chips and digital signatures.
(Singe1 2005) The government is reconsidering security measures in light of tests
showing that passport chips could be read from a distance of up to 30 feet, not the 10 cm

range they had previously held to. A solution under consideration involves the
requirement of a reader password and encryption of the data transmitted between the chip
and, the reader (Zetter 2005). Presumably it would be feasible for the border crossing
RFID reader to identify other items that contain W I D tags within a person's vehicle or
on their person, items that are possibly illegal to bring into the country.

3.4.2 Pervasive RFID Reader Environments
With the proliferation of RFID tags comes the necessity of collecting data
gathered through those tags. The more readers in place, the more data can be collected.
Thus evolves a pervasive system of RFID readers, seeping into every aspect of life,
whether in the home, office, vehicle, grocery store, or on the street corner.
The home of the future has great potential to draw on RFID technology. The
vision is that homeowners won't be bothered with remembering such mundane details
and tasks as making grocery lists, choosing washing machine settings, and adjusting
light, temperature, and music to their personal preferences. RFID will do all of this for
the homeowner. Readers dispersed throughout the home will detect which individual has
entered the room through tags on their person and will adjust environmental settings
accordingly. Washing machines will contain readers to scan the tags on clothing and
microwaves will read food package tags so that the appropriate options will be chosen.
Refrigerator readers will be alerted when supplies are low or the milk expiration date has
passed and can reorder groceries to be delivered right to the door. Those same readers can
determine which products are on the shelves of the refrigerator, in the kitchen cupboards,
or within the medicine cabinet and send tailored commercials to the homeowner's

television. Medicine cabinet readers can not only determine the particular drugs on the
shelf, but also track patient consumption and alert the patient and hisher doctor or
pharmacist to any deviation from prescribed usage (Dipert 2004). Other readers in the
home can be queried to locate misplaced eyeglasses or keys. Shelf readers can catalog the
entire book or music collection in the home. If a product recall occurs on a purchased
item, the networked reader at the front door that recorded the tagged item on its way into
the home, and could then alert the homeowner to the recall (Garfinkel 2002).
Once leaving the home, individuals will face readers within and tags attached to
their vehicles. The UK is considering the adoption of license plates containing RFID tags.
These tags could be read from a distance of up to 300 feet, from stationary readers
embedded within the environment or located within surveillance vehicles, recording
vehicle locations wherever a reader was placed (Dipert 2004). Another potential use of
RFID involves placing e-tags into windshield stickers. A system currently exists that
allows for electronic toll collection and vehicle registration through windshield e-tags. If
implemented by law enforcement, readers could automatically monitor traffic to locate
uninsured vehicles, those with expired registration or outstanding violations, as well as
those noncompliant with emissions regulations (Smith and Konsynski 2003).
Various theme parks within the United States and other countries are using RFIDembedded wristbands to allow parents to locate their children should they become
separated, or family and friends to locate each other within the park through use of touchscreen kiosks (Gilbert 2004). Locating abducted children within a future pervasive RFID
environment is another potential application of W I D technology. If the family of a child
knew what clothing or other RFID-tagged items the child was wearing at the time of the

abduction, perhaps scanning the child with a personal W I D reader before the child left
the house each morning, records from RFID readers could be searched for those
paflicular tag ID numbers. Specific readers placed at bus stations, toll booths or other
areas could be helpful in determining the route followed by the abductor and child.
If a trip to the grocery store is necessary, a person will find readers there as well.
Pilot stores such as the METRO Extra Future Store in Rheinberg, Germany showcase
RFID potential. Smart shelves determine when shelf inventories are getting low and
restocking of tagged products is necessary. Product prices are adjusted on the shelf LCD
labels as inventory increases or decreases. When an RFID-tagged DVD is scanned at the
video kiosk, a movie trailer plays. Rather than waiting at the checkout, people will soon
be able to push the cart right past a reader that instantly records all items within the cart
and automatically deducts the amount from the person's checking account or charges a
credit card (McHugh 2004). However, products are not the only objects containing RFID
tags at the Future Store. Tags have also been embedded in loyalty cards, which when
carried through the entrance RFID gates could potentially track which customers are
entering or leaving the store, or the route of a customer while in the store (Albrecht
2004).
Like the home, office environments will be automatically regulated as to the
preference of an individual entering a room. A person's desktop could appear on any
computer she approaches for use. Surveillance of employees will no doubt expand as
employee locations and activities can be continuously recorded. Surveillance will follow
that employee out the door and down the street as readers record what she is wearing and
carrying through the tags on her clothing and other portable items on her person. RFID

may facilitate time efficient crime for the thief located on the corner or in the parking,lot,
determining his next victim with a mobile reader in hand.

3.5 Issues and Challenges to Face in RFID Adoption

Many hurtles must be overcome before RFID technology is implemented on a
wide scale basis. Changing from one type of system to another, in this case barcode to
RFID technology, usually necessitates a major financial investment and companies first
want to make sure they will receive a sufficient return on their investment. However, cost
is not the only issue to face. This section outlines some of these issues, reserving a
discussion of privacy related issues for Chapter 4.

3.5.1 Cost
A substantial investment, both in time and resources, is required for compliance
with mandates such as Wal-Mart's requirement for its 100 top suppliers to tag cases and
pallets by a January 2005 deadline. First year expenses for a large supplier (16 million
cases and pallets) to meet this mandate might be as high as $9 million. An estimate for a
consumer packaged goods manufacturer to implement RFID in shipping 50 million cases
per year breaks down as follows: $5-10 million for tags and readers; $3-$5 million for
system integration; $3-$5 million for modifications to existing supply chain applications;
and $2-$3 million for storage and data analytics, altogether adding up to $13-$23 million
(Asif and Mandviwalla 2005). Tagging of individual items, rather than just cases or
pallets, will greatly increase these costs. However, it is the tagging on a per item basis
that provides the capability for many proposed applications.

With the deployment of more tags comes the generation of greater quantities of
data, leading to the necessity of more sophisticated software and IT design. According to
Asif and Mandviwalla (2005), "...such data volumes will impose severe strains on
existing data management and storage structures and strategies." One proposed method of
dealing with the massive data generation is the Savant system (Sarma et al. 2002)
developed by the Auto-ID Center at MIT. This software is designed to filter data received
by the reader, to sort out errors such as duplicate tag reading or "phantom" or false reads
sometimes occurring in manufacturing settings. Savant then sends the clean data to the
back end system applications, reducing chances of overloading a system (Asif and
Mandviwalla 2005).
Training of personnel represents another potentially large expense. In addition to
training the workers who will be directly using the technology, there is also the need to
find individuals that are skilled in implementing RFID technology and integrating it with
current systems. According to Asif and Mandviwalla (2005), "...middleware has not
advanced to a 'plug-and-play7 stage, which means that initial adopters will have to spend
considerable effort to integrate RFID into their existing business processes."
Another direction in which companies will have to focus attention is in discerning
customer desires and developing marketing tactics relevant to RFID technology. "Speed
and cost are the relatively easy and obvious goals of RFID enabling a supply chain; the
more interesting and potentially strategic application may include integrating supply
chain concepts with customer (marketing) strategies (Asif and Mandviwalla 2005)."

3.5.2 Lack of Standards
Standards are vital for interoperability and can reduce costs. Without large-scale
adoption, equipment costs will not decrease, but without universal standards, this
adoption is not as likely to occur. RFID users do not want to implement a RFID system
based on current standards, then have to totally revamp the system later on when new
standards are adopted, or face the issue of lack of interoperability between their system
and others sectors in their supply chain, whether in this country or internationally (Asif
and Mandviwalla 2005). A recently ratified standard may aid in dealing with this issue.
EPCglobal, a standards body for retail supply, has ratified the Electronic Product Code
(EPC) UHF Class 1 Generation 2 RFID protocol. The EPCglobal Network "provides the
infrastructure for sharing RFID-enabled information about products in the supply chain
(Hulme 2004)."

3.5.3 Security
Due to the restricted computational ability of tags, security measures such as
cryptographic algorithms are difficult to apply. Theoretically any reader within range of a
tag can gain access to data encoded on the tag's microchip, as RFID tags for the most part
cannot authenticate readers (Asif and Mandviwalla 2005). However, within a Generation
2-compliant system, there is the capacity for the tag to require a password before it will
communicate with the reader and allow the reader to access tag memory (Intermec 2005).
Even though capabilities such as password protected access to tag memory and to initiate
the kill command are included in the Gen 2 standard, use of these capabilities is optional

and they may not be employed in certain tags due to increased cost (Bailey and Juels
2006).

3.5.4 Accuracy

Although W I D technology is advancing, reader accuracy has fallen short of 90
percent in some cases. Performance of readers can be affected by conditions within a
tag's environment, such as the proximity of tags to products or packaging containing
metal or water that affect absorption of radio waves, or from electromagnetic
interference. Changes to the 'physical infrastructure' may be necessary, for example, to
deal with nylon conveyor belts producing static (Asif and Mandviwalla 2005).
With the move from pallet and case tagging to the tagging of individual items, the
ability to read greater numbers of tags simultaneously becomes critical. If multiple tags
enter a reader's vicinity there is the potential for tag collision, causing either misreads or
no reads to occur. 'Singulation' techniques, such as the 'tree walking' technique
mentioned in section 3.1.2, allow the request of data from only specified tags
distinguished through their serial number (Asif and Mandviwalla 2005; Weis 2003). The
Aloha is an anti-collision algorithm in which tag collision is evaded through random
delay of tag responses (Weis 2003).
Through these and other methods, advancement towards a more accurate and
secure design is being made. This is vital, because if issues such as accuracy or the others
mentioned in this section are not addressed, supply chain management may not see the
benefit of investing huge sums to adopt W I D technology over barcodes, absent mandates
requiring the technology.

Chapter 4
RFID PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS AND ISSUES

Fear of new technology and its potential threat to personal privacy has caused
some to call for an outright ban on RFID technology, while others simply wish to limit its
use. Still other groups and individuals believe that RFID technology should be exploited
to its full potential. "As a society, we typically overestimate the short-term impact of new
technologies and underestimate their long-term impacts (Smith and Konsynski 2003)."
Like many other technologies, it is only as RFID technology evolves and new
applications are developed that certain societal implications from the use of this
technology present themselves. It is often d.ifficult to foresee or predict what may occur
down the road.

4.1 Uniqueness of RFID Related Privacy Issues
In a statement on RFID technology given before the House Subcommittee on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Bruening (2004) outlined three ways that
data collection through RFID technology is distinctly different from other technologies.
These differences include the invisibility or hidden nature of the technology, the passivity
of the consumer in the data collection process, and the type or detail of the data collected.
Due to the small size in which RFID microchips can now be produced, RFlD tags
are in effect invisible to the eye. Recently Hitachi introduced the 0.4mm square y-chip
(Hitachi 2004). As RFID technology continues to develop, microchip dimensions will no
doubt be reduced even farther, allowing for a decrease in tag dimensions as well. The

small size will allow the tags to be virtually undetectable when embedded within objects
such as clothing, food or other product packaging, and even shipping labels or paper.
Since consumers inay be unaware of the tag's existence, or the existence of RFID readers
in the surrounding environment, they most likely will also be unaware of the data
collection taking place as they go about their daily routines. This is in contrast to the
visibility of the data gathering process involving loyalty cards or bar codes (Bruening
2004).
The consumer plays a passive role in the RFID data collection process. When a
consumer uses a credit card for purchasing, the consumer takes an "active step" to
become involved in the transaction and the subsequent transfer of information relating to
the transaction - credit card account number, type of goods or service purchased, as well
as the location and time of the transaction. However, no active step is required to become
involved in data transfer through RFID use, and so the transfer of data may be hidden
from the consumer. Unlike credit card statements received on a monthly basis detailing
purchases, RFID data gatherers do not inform individuals of what information was
collected and by whom (Bruening 2004).
RFID allows the collection of data at a level of detail never before possible. The
technology will allow data gatherers to go beyond the personal profiles amassed today.
Rather than just knowing you bought a copy of a particular book, the "globally unique"
ID number that can be stored within a RFID tag allows the determination of exactly
which copy of the book you bought and where you went with the book after purchase
(Bruening 2004). This scenario can be expanded to include the purchase and subsequent
tracking of any item containing a tag in the future.

The result of these distinctions of RFID technology is that much more information
can be collected and therefore the potential and the desirability of data sharing increase
greatly. As with the use of cookies for online interest assessments, RFIDs would allow
businesses to determine not only what consumers buy, but if a RFID tag were embedded
within a loyalty card, which items consumers showed interest in as they moved through a
store. According to Bruening (2004), "RFID transfers to the brick and mortar world the
type of very specific tracking of interests that is possible online."
The uniqueness of RFID issues raises some questions for which there may be no
easy answers. Harvard Law professor Jerry Kang, speaking at the RFID Privacy
Workshop held at MIT in IVovember 2003, posed several societal choices to be made
regarding RFID technology and privacy (Weis 2004), including:
-

Who controls the information that RFID systems generate?

- How do people make difficult decisions about using RFID in the presence of
coercion or the lack of viable alternatives?

-

When does society have the right to override individual privacy?

4.2 Privacy Issues Raised by Current Applications
One impetus for greater privacy protection stems from the increasing ability to
link personal data collected from various sources. RFID technology takes this to another
level by adding location data to those personal records, providing additional context for
an individual's actions. According to Weinberg (2004), "RFID is important from a
privacy standpoint even where it only facilitates the collection of information that could
otherwise be collected by analog means, automating the information collection and

storage process." For example, the manual recording of license plate numbers of vehicles
traveling on a highway, versus RFID readers automatically recording the unique ID
number in RFID embedded tires or other vehicle parts, with that ID number linked to an
automobile's VIN in another database (Weinberg 2004). Both approaches can reveal, if
not who was driving each vehicle, at least who the vehicle was registered to. "RFID
readers ...collect the information in a format that makes its inclusion in networked
databases trivial. That's important, because the cheaper it is to collect, store and analyze
information, the more information will in fact be collected, stored and analyzed
(Weinberg 2004)."

4.2.1 Tracking

A major thrust of RFID technology today is towards tracing the movements of
objects or people. Provided an object itself isn't being transported by or linked somehow
with the movements of a person, tracking the object may raise relatively few concerns.
However, the idea of having one's movements tracked throughout various aspects of
one's life would not appeal to most individuals. Employees, for example, are often under
the microscope on -theirjobs. Using RFID technology, employers may be able to keep
fairly constant tabs on their employees from the moment they arrive at work, through
their breaks, and until they head out the door at the end of the day. Although active RFID
tags are required to provide continuous monitoring of movements and for actual location
determination, passive tags can still reveal a good deal of information about a person's
behavior and travel. For example, if workers are required to carry RFID embedded ID
cards on their person or to gain access to certain areas of a facility, using strategically

placed RFID readers would make it possible to record when an employee passed a certain
reader or entered a restricted area. Inferences could then be made regarding behavior,
whether or not those inferences were in fact true. If an employee had to pass a reader
when traveling in or out of hislher office, it could be determined how long that employee
was out of the office, whether on break or carrying out some task. Determination of
which route a person travels through the office is also possible. An employer may want to
find out why an employee always goes by a particular desk or office, even though it may
be out of the way for the task being performed. In this way it may be possible to
determine with whom a worker is associating or perhaps organizing (Plichta 2004). These
types of monitoring are not indicative of a friendly workplace environment and may tend
to cause anxiety and stress.

4.2.2 Data Aggregation
As previously stated, data collection and aggregation is a large issue to face in
personal privacy protection. RFID tags and readers only compound the problem, as they
allow linkage of even more intimate data to one's current location. Generally, the more
information that is gathered and aggregated, the greater the incentive that exists to breach
personal information records, and the greater the threat once those records are breached.
A computer security class of 41 graduate students at Johns Hopkins University recently
demonstrated how easy it is to obtain and aggregate personal records. They carried out a
project in which they proved that "...all it takes to obtain reams of personal data is
Internet access, a few dollars and some spare time (Zeller 2005)." The task was to
"vacuum up" as many records and databases as they could through legal, public sources

of information, with a budget of no more than $50 per student group. Students were able
to acquire such databases as those related to death records, property tax, and occupational
licenses. Methods through which the records were obtained included filing FOIA requests
with local government offices or merely asking for information, and writing computer
scripts to "pick up" databases online, whether governmental or free commercial databases
such as yellow page directories. Several groups were able to obtain over a million
records, showing on a small scale what large data warehouses are able to accomplish. As
Professor Rubin points out regarding his students, "Imagine what they could do if they
had money and unlimited time (Zeller 2005)." Jason Brandeis, an A.C.L.U. lawyer, states
that "a balance needs to be struck between the public interest in open access to
government information, and the need to protect individual privacy (Zeller 2005)."
However, as Zeller (2005) acknowledges, "whether such a balance can ever be achieved
when so much information is already available is an open question."
Although disclosure of information such as the value of an individual's property,
which political party one belongs to, or which occupation one practices may not in
themselves seem particularly distressing, when numerous records are linked, the ability to
make inferences regarding an individual becomes easier (Zeller 2005). Integration with
location data adds substantially to inferencing possibilities.

4.2.3 Profiling
Once data has been collected and combined, this facilitates individual profiling.
Through embedded RFID tags, product information can be linked to a particular

consumer, from which assumptions regarding the consumer's health, income, lifestyle, or
location can be made (Cavoukian 2004).
Langheinrich (2002b) feels that profiles are a threat to "universal equality."
Although in the case of frequent flyer miles one may receive special offers or rewards
based on a high number of miles, the opposite is also true. As Langheinrich (2002b)
points out, ". . .even though a thoroughly customized future (using ubiquitous computing)
where I get only the information that is relevant to my (very comprehensive profile) holds
great promise, the fact that at the same time a large amount of information might be
deliberately withheld from me because I am not considered a valued recipient of such
information, constitutes a severe privacy violation for many people."
An example of the profiling potential through RFID data collection is the
SmarTrip fare card used by Washington DC's Metro system. The fare card contains an
RFID chip, allowing storage of a cardholder's personal data, such as name, address, and
phone number, as well as collection of data on hislher use of the Metro system. This data
includes the location and time of arrival at and departure from the Metro system, as well
as Metro parking lots. The type of information derived from the data allows for the
profiling of cardholders, but unlike state agency records, the data is not protected by law,
only an internal Metro privacy policy (EPIC 2005).
As discussed in section 4.2.1, RFID employee monitoring can lead to inferences
being drawn regarding behavior. However, employees aren't the only ones who need to
consider whether they are being monitored and profiled. Marc Rotenberg, executive
director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, points out that students carrying
RFID embedded student cards may be watched as well, revealing with whom they

associate, thus promoting assignment to a certain group and possibly subjecting them to
more intense scrutiny based on their associations (Zetter 2005). As Weinberg (2004)
brings out, ". ..RFID signifiers travel with the subject in the physical world, conveying
information to devices that otherwise wouldn't recognize her, and that can take actions
based on that information."

4.3 Potential Privacy Issues Raised by Future Applications
Many of the privacy concerns relating to current RFID applications also apply to
future applications, but on a grander scale. As the technology becomes more pervasive
and ubiquitous, the ability to collect personal data will increase at a potentially alarming
rate. Developing a means to regulate the collection and linking of personal data will
become even more crucial with the movement towards creation of an infrastructure
allowing mass data collection and processing.

4.3.1 Per Item Tagging
The commercial buzz about RFID is growing and more corporations are
beginning to invest in this technology. However, before RFID is widely deployed on a
per item basis, the cost will have to come down. A recent study by the ARC Advisory
Group estimates that passive UHF W I D tags will only drop in price to an average of 16
cents by 2008, not the once proclaimed 5 cents. They do acknowledge that if purchased
in large enough quantities, it may be possible for some manufacturers to offer 5-cent tags
(Ward 2004). It is estimated that at this point, the availability of a 5-cent tag, wide scale
adoption of RFID technology will occur. Since it is impossible to predict with any

certainty just how quickly technology will progress, possibly allowing a shorter than
estimated time period for a drop in prices, a timeline for RFID adoption is not feasible at
this, time. There is generally consensus on one point, however. Once the floodgates of
RFID technology open up, the potential exists for tagging just about every consumer
product made. This includes all clothing, in which the tags could store size, brand, price,
as well as purchase location and date, or any other portable item that could be worn or
carried. Items such as vehicles may contain multiple tags in various vehicle parts,
facilitating collection of many different types of data. In addition, individuals possessing
their own RFID readers may desire to tag their belongings in order to inventory
collections, locate an item, or simply to identify an item as their own.

4.3.2 Surveillance
With widespread deployment of RFID technology looming in the near future, the
issue of location tracking becomes an issue of all out surveillance of almost every
moment of life. Were there to be a pervasive network of RFID readers dispersed
throughout the environment - the home, the store, the office, and on every street comer with tags embedded in most if not all consumer products, the potential threat to retaining
even a modicum of privacy becomes enormous. There is some question as to whether a
pervasive network of RFID readers could ever be assembled, and there is the belief that
without this network, continuous location tracking would not be possible. However, as
Weinberg (2004) points out, "if RFID use becomes widespread, then various commercial
and governmental users are likely to deploy a wide range of discrete reader networks. If
there are economic and political incentives for the proprietors of those various networks

to share information (and there are likely to be), then we will face the functional
equivalent of a single very large network. At that point, any particular set of readers need
not, be pervasive." Weinberg (2004) relates a reader network to a "Panopticon
geolocator" due to its ability to link identities with RFID tags, while providing location
data.
Densely populated reader networks with readers located every few feet would not
necessarily be required to enable continuous tracking. Positioning readers at "strategic
locations"

-

entrances to buildings or entrance and exit ramps on highways or at street

corners - could potentially generate enough data to provide fairly detailed location logs
of individuals, whether traveling on foot or in a vehicle (CASPIAN et al. 2003). In
addition to the possibility of an individual's location records being stored in a database
for anyone gaining access to see, CASPIAN et al. (2003) argue that RFID tag location
and data could in fact be transmitted to satellites by means of readers enabled with
satellite communication capabilities, allowing real-time tracking of movements. This type
of technology is already being employed in the tracking of product shipments as they
move across the country.
One rising fear is the possible use of a pervasive network for government
surveillance purposes (EPIC 2004~).By placing readers at building entrances, it would in
theory make possible the automatic compilation of the identity of attendees to any
particular event. This could result in the inclusion of these individuals on a government
watch list in the future, prompt further surveillance or perhaps even arrest (Weinberg
2004). Although it would be difficult not to be traced through RFID tags were they
embedded in clothing and other objects carried on the person, if implantable RFID

devices became mandatory for certain individuals, perhaps even being put into drivers
licenses (Weinberg 2004), there would be no escape from surveillance for these ones.
The U.S. military has discussed implanting RFIDs into soldiers, to provide quick access
to medical records linked to the unique ID number of the tag. Rotenberg claims there is a
real possibility of 'chipping' other individuals as well - prisoners, parolees, and children
(Zetter 2005). Even though identification of a particular driver may not be possible
through the scanning of one RFID tag, such as on a vehicle's tire, by "cross referencing"
other tags within the vehicle or on the person, such as a tag in a library book, a link to
that person's identity may be possible (Plichta 2004).
Another arena for pervasive networks to operate within is the retail environment.
Stores such as the METRO Extra Future Store in Rheinberg, Germany, discussed in
section 3.4.2, are designed with the plan of fazing RFID into most facets of store
operation. The problem is, ". . .if a person enters a store carrying several RFID tags.. .one
reader can read the data emitted by all of the tags, and not simply the signal relayed by
in-store products. This capacity enables retailers with RFID readers to compile a more
complete profile of shoppers than would be possible by simply scanning the bar codes of
products a consumer purchases (EPIC 2004c)."
The Extra Future Store claims protection of customer security through its "DeActivator," which is supposed to disable RFID tags on items before they are removed
from the store, by overwriting the chip's number code with zeros. As Albrecht (2004)
discovered, this device does not in fact de-activate the tag at all. The number that is
overwritten is merely the product code, which is the same for every like item of a specific
brand. The unique ID number assigned to the particular item is not destroyed. This point

becomes very important when considering the future potential for pervasive RFID reader
networks.

4.3.3 Security Against Unauthorized Access
With the potential for massive data collection, ensuring the security of data stored
on and linked to an RFID tag is imperative. As appalling as it might seem to many for
anyone to be collecting this data, the idea of an unauthorized person or group obtaining
this data and possibly using it to the harm of an individual is even worse. Access to tag
data may be accomplished by "skimming" the data on the chip with an unauthorized
reader (Zetter 2005). Interception of the communication between a tag and an authorized
reader is also possible (Garfinkel 2002). Eavesdropping readers can identify the contents
of a purse, bag, or pocket, providing data to whoever wants it, including market
researchers and thieves (Weis et al. 2003). In addition, data may be "hijacked as it
travels from a reader to the data storage location (Hulme 2004).
Spoofing of tags is a potential security problem, especially in retail environments.
A thief may be able to "fool automated checkout or security systems into thinking a
product was still on a shelf' or exchange data from the tag of an expensive item with that
of a cheaper item (Weis et al. 2003).
At the 2004 Black Hat security conference, Grunwald demonstrated a program he
helped create, known as RFDump. The program can read, alter, delete, or destroy tag
data. The program requ.ires only "an inexpensive plug-in tag reader attached to a
handheld, notebook, or desktop running Windows or Linux (Hulme 2004)." Although
most EPCglobal passive tags were at one time write-only, those now being deployed have

multiple-write capability, allowing alteration of tag data or for tags to be written to
several thousand times (Hulme 2004). Even tags with password protected memory might
be susceptible to brute-force attacks initiated to obtain passwords, allowing access to and
therefore alteration of tag data (Newitz 2006).
Finding new means of dealing with these threats to the security of personal
information in the use of RFID technology is essential. Developing privacy protections
and security measures for this technology before mass deployment occurs would tend to
make its introduction less costly and more likely to be implemented.

Chapter 5
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO LOCATION
PRIVACY PROTECTION

A significant concern relative to location privacy is the potential for linking data
regarding an individual's location with other personal information, promoting the
discovery of spatial inferences or patterns. RFID technology facilitates that link between
personal information and location. The location of a tag can be determined through the
location of the reader recording its unique ID, which may be linked to ever increasing
amounts of stored personal information. This chapter examines legal, technological, and
combined approaches to protecting location privacy, from general concepts that could be
applied to RFID technology, to RFID specific ideas.

5.1 Legal Approaches
This section outlines legislative approaches to protecting location privacy in
general and also specifically as it relates to W I D technology, from both U.S. and
international perspectives. In addition, proposed guidelines for the implementation and
use of W I D technology, along with resolutions emulating similar principles and goals
are considered. Evaluation of these types of approaches is also discussed.

5.1.1 General Location Privacy
As mentioned in section 2.2.1 the U.S. has been reluctant to enact privacy
legislation applying to the commercial sector and it has been even less inclined to enact
specific location privacy legislation. The proposed Location Privacy Act of 2001 would

have required location-based service providers to give their customers "clear ,and
conspicuous notice" as to planned uses of their location data, as well as requiring an "optin", rule for use of that data. Prior to this proposed legislation the Cellular
Telecommunications & Internet Association had suggested comparable rules for
regulating its own industry to the FCC, recognizing the need for clarification in this
arena. The FCC decided on an "opt-out" requirement instead, and did not provide
clarification through adoption of location privacy rules, feeling that these might
"constrain the still-developing market for location-based services (White 2003)."
European governments have been more sympathetic towards protection of
personal data, supplying this protection through the EU Data Protection Directives 95/46/EC, 97/66/EC, and 2002/58/EC. EU Directive 2002/58/EC provides privacy
protection within the electronic communications sector, relating to the processing of
personal data and requiring explicit user or subscriber consent through an "opt-in" policy.
It relates to the location-based services industry in that it contains definitions of traffic
data, location data, and value added services and gives rules on how "traffic data" and
"location data other than traffic data" may be used. For instance, Article 6 specifies that
traffic data should be either erased or made anonymous if no longer required for
transmitting a communication (Zevenbergen 2004).
Recent U.S. legislative attempts at more general data privacy protection could
supply a basis for guiding principles to be applied in the location privacy arena as well.
The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005 (S. 1332), recently introduced in the
U.S. Senate, attempts to provide standards to protect personally identifiable information.
A similar failed attempt at data privacy protection was the California Data Broker Access

and Accuracy Act of 2005 (S.B. 550), which would have regulated the "disclosure of
personally identifiable information by data brokers." The Act included requirements for
disclosing to individuals what personally identifiable information was collected about
them, investigating disputed items, specifying procedures to control access to
information, and the potential for initiating civil actions if there were violations of the
provisions of the Act. Although this legislation would have allowed the potential
collection of damages if data abuse occurred, White (2003) suggests that perhaps a better
approach might be to develop a "culture of privacy protection" by means of a "more
pervasive regime" such as the EU Data Directives or the FTC Fair Information Practices,
as the "prevention of data abuse is far preferable to consumers than the collection of
damages after some particularly heinous data abuse (White 2003)."
It would be prudent to perform a costhenefit analysis when considering which
type of "regime" would work best in providing data privacy protection, looking at both
tangible and intangible associated costs. According to Hahn and Layne-Farrar (White
2003), some of the estimated business costs associated with fair information practice
compliance are: $2-$5 billion to financial institutions to provide notice by designing,
printing, and mailing privacy notices to customers under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley bill;
$1 1.8 billion for ten-year compliance by the health industry to provide choice - allowing
individual information use with consent; and $100 million to correct errors in consumer
credit reports when providing access. However, the costs to consumers for lack of
privacy protections can be high as well. When weighing the benefits and costs of an "optin" versus an "opt-out" rule, Kang (White 2003) gives several reasons why an "opt-out"
rule provides the higher cost to consumers. First, there is the cost of determining if an

individual's personal information has been shared, with whom, and who currently, has
access to the information. Secondly, those who want to 'flip' or contract around the
default rule, might not have the power to bargain for it.
Though U.S. legislation regarding personal data protection has been somewhat lax
so far, there may be opportunity for data protection within the realm of data mining. As
White (2003) asks, "is there a point at which data that would not in itself receive privacy
protection become protectable because the use of technology has altered the reasonable
expectation of privacy." With the potential for continuous tracking and data gathering
capabilities through mass implementation of RFID technology, a many fold increase in
data abuse becomes a likely prospect without stronger data protection controls being put
in place.

5.1.2 RFID Specific
A number of U.S. states including New Mexico, Missouri, Utah, and
Massachusetts have recently considered RFID bills, but various attempts to pass RFID
specific legislation have failed. For example, in 2004 California rejected a bill introduced
by Senator Deborah Bowen that would have regulated the use of RFID tags for
businesses and libraries and would only allow collection of information from tagged
items that were bought, borrowed or rented, not those that may have just been picked up
or handled by an individual. The bill would also have prohibited collection of information
from tagged clothing or purselwallet contents. Bowen argued that RFID specific
legislation should be addressed before the technology is deployed in order to avoid costly
or difficult modifications to bring the technology in line with future regulations.

Opponents felt that legislation was "inappropriate" prior to determination of potential
uses of the technology (Swedberg 2004). California has considered another piece of
legislation relating to RFID technology, specifically as used in identification documents.
Under S.B. 682, the Identity Information Protection Act of 2005, it would be a
misdemeanor for "...a person or entity that knowingly or willfully remotely reads or
attempts to remotely read a person's identification document using radio waves, without
the knowledge of that person.. ." One piece of federal legislation proposed by Consumers
Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering (CASPIAN) was the RFID Right
to Know Act of 2003, which mandated the "labeling of RFID-enabled products and
consumer privacy protections (CASPIAN 2003)." A recent successful attempt at passage
of RFID legislation is a law in Wisconsin (Assembly Bill 290) banning the forcible
implantation of RFID chips in humans.
Bruening of the Center for Democracy & Technology agrees that addressing
privacy "at the outset of the development process" rather than after deployment "is more
effective and efficient (Bruening 2004)." Iiowever, Bruening argues that "to enact
legislation specifically for RFID would risk technology mandates that are ill-suited to the
future evolution of the technology." Therefore another legislative approach would be to
consider "technologically-neutral baseline privacy legislation." According to Bruening
(2004) this type of legislation "would ensure that retail and marketing uses of the
technology in conjunction with personal information were bounded by fair information
practices." Bruening (2004) outlines some of the common elements of fair information
practices that would apply to RFID technology including:

Notice:

Information collection and use should be open and

transparent.

Purpose specijication: Personal data should be relevant to the
purposes for which it is collected.

Use limitation: Data should be used for only the purpose for
which it was collected.

Accuracy: Personal data should be accurate, complete, and timely.
Security: Personal data should be protected by reasonable security
safeguards against risk of loss, unauthorized access, destruction,
use, modification or disclosure.

Access: Individuals should have a right to view all information
that is collected about them to correct data that is not timely,
accurate, relevant or complete.

Accountability:

Record keepers should be accountable for

complying with fair information practices.
EPIC (2004a), among others, has addressed the application of similar OECD
Guidelines to RFID technology. In addition to applying these guidelines, the RFID
Position Statement of Consumer Privacy and Civil Liberties Organizations (CASPIAN et
al. 2003) also suggests the need for a technology assessment by a neutral party, a process
that is "multidisciplinary, involving all stakeholders, including consumers," as well as a
statement of what practices are to be barred, such as human tracking or using the
technology so as to "eliminate or reduce anonymity."

When initially considering application of fair information practices to simple
RFID data collection systems, there does not appear to be a good fit (Weinberg 2004).
Dat,a collection can be performed by anyone, whether or not the intended user, and absent
reader detection devices, the individual with tagged items most probably would not be
aware of the collection taking place. For fair information practices to work well there
must be "clearly identified data collectors." However, for "systems in which devices blab
information indiscriminately," it's hard to identify the collectors so as to enforce rules
against them (Weinberg 2004). This leads to several ideas on how to approach RFID
regulation. One idea is to apply Fair Information Practices specifically to the linkage of
personal identifying information to the tag data. The other is to restrict readers from data
collection by barring reader use unless a warning is provided, by example requiring
readers to emit a tone, light or other such indicator of reader activity (Weinberg 2004;
Garfinkel 2002).
Garfinkel (2002) proposes an "RFID Bill of Rights" which applies principles
originally set out in the Code of Fair Information Practices (HEW 1973) to RFID
technology. Garfinkel's Bill of Rights (2002) includes five guidelines for RFID systems:
"Users of RFID systems and purchasers of products containing W I D tags
have :
1.

The right to know if a product contains an RFID tag.

2.

The right to have embedded RFID tags removed,
deactivated, or destroyed when a product is purchased.

3.

The right to first class RFID alternatives: consumers should
not lose other rights (e.g. the right to return a product or to

travel on a particular road) if they decide to opt-out of
RFID or exercise an RFID tag's "kill" feature.
4.

The right to know what information is stored inside their
RFID tags. If this information is incorrect, there must be a
means to correct or amend it.

5.

The right to know when, where, and why an RFID tag is
being read."

EPCglobal, one of the two main groups setting RFID standards, has created
"Guidelines on EPC for Consumer Products" (EPCglobal 2005) which reflect to some
extent Garfinkel's RFID Bill of Rights recommendations. However, according to
Garfinkel (2004), the "guidelines are significantly watered down" from those which he
proposed. For instance, although the guidelines (EPCglobal 2005) state that consumers
should be given notice as to which products or packaging contain an EPC tag, there is no
mention of the consumer's right to be notified of the presence of a reader, when a tag is
being read, or specifically why the tag data is being collected. Also, according to
Guideline 2 (EPCglobal 2005), "...consumers will be informed of the choices that are
available to discard or remove or in the future disable EPC tags from the products they
acquire.. ." It does not say that consumers have the right to d.iscard, remove, or deactivate
tags, only that consumers are to be informed of the available choices, whatever they may
be (Garfinkel 2004).
International concern regarding the potential for linking RFID-tagged items with
personal information led to adoption of the Resolution on Radio-Frequency Identification
by the International Conference of Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners on 20

November 2003. This resolution (Rotenberg 2003) states that the "basic principles of data
protection and privacy law have to be observed when designing, implementing and using
RFID technology. In particular
a) any controller - before introducing RFID tags linked to personal information
or leading to customer profiles

-

should first consider alternatives which

achieve the same goal without collecting personal information or profiling
customers;
b) if the controller can show that personal data are indispensable, -they must be
collected in an open and transparent way;
c) personal data may only be used for the specific purpose for which they were
first collected and only retained for as long as necessary to achieve (or carry
out) this purpose, and
d) whenever RFID tags are in the possession of individuals, they should have the
possibility to delete data and to disable or destroy the tags."
Within the European arena, the EU Data Protection Directives 95146lEC and
2002158lEC should provide some protection of personal data collected through RFID
technology. According to Cedric Laurant (2004), Policy Counsel for the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, these directives apply to "...individual tracking and the
association of data with personal identification. As a result, any use of RFID tags that
involves the processing of personal data is likely to be subject to a number of data
protection obligations." However, as concluded by the National Consumer Council's
(Lace 2004) summit on the future of RFID technology in retail, "...some in-store uses of
the technology may concern consumers, but not involve their personal data, so the Data

Protection Act would not provide protection." Another NCC summit finding related to
the danger of marginalization of consumers from the RFID debate, so that they would not
have a say in "whether and how RFID developed and was implemented (Lace 2004)."
The Working Document on Data Protection Issues Related to RFID Technology
(WP105) was created by an EU advisory board, Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party (2005), with two stated purposes: to provide guidance to those deploying RFID
technology so as to apply the basic principles set out in EC Directives 95/46/EC and
2002/58/EC, and to provide guidance to manufacturers of W I D technology in addition to
standardization bodies as to "their responsibility towards designing privacy compliant
technology in order to enable deployers of the technology to carry out their obligations
under the data protection Directive [95/46/EC]." In addition to the requirement under
Article 10 of the Directive, that data controllers provide information to data subjects such
as controller identity, processing purpose, data recipients, and a right to access data, the
Working Party 29 suggests that, "depending on the specific use of RFID, the data
controller will also have to inform individuals about: (v) how to discard, disable or
remove tags from the products, thus preventing them from disclosing further information
and (vi) how to exercise the right of access to information." The Working Party stated
regarding RFID interoperability, that it may "have some negative side effects for data
protection unless appropriate measures are taken. For example, the principle of purpose
limitation may be more difficult to apply and to control. Moreover, the management of
access rights regarding privacy might also become more critical as the number of actors
manipulating the data will increase." Working Party 29 felt that in the future additional
guidance "will be particularly necessary if RFID technology becomes, as expected, one

of the main "bricks" of the future ambient intelligence environment (Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party 2005)"
The Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD 2005) issued the Resolution on
Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) in April 2005, providing recommendations to the
EU and US governments. Some of these recommendations included funding research
relating to RFID impact on consumers, consulting "with all RFID stakeholders, including
consumer organizations and independent academic researchers," and monitoring
"whether RFID is being used in anti-competitive ways (TACD 2005)"
In June of 2004, Japan's Ministry of Inner Affairs and Telecommunication and
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry issued the Guidelines for Privacy
Protection on Electronic Tags (Natsui 2005). These guidelines include the right of
consumers to de-activate tags and entrust businesses with the responsibility of notifying
consumers of de-activation procedures through explanation, posting, or inclusion of the
information on products or packaging containing a tag. Also, consent from the data
subject must be obtained before a use of tag data other than the original stated purpose or
before release of tag information to another entity. In addition the guidelines encourage
the education of consumers on RFID technology through business and governmental
agency efforts (Natsui 2005).
In the comments of the FTC Workshop on Radio Frequency Identification, EPIC
(2004a) enumerated its recommendations regarding RFID technology to the FTC. These
recommendations included: setting guidelines for the "private manufacturing and retail
sector" and establishing standards for users; requiring a technology assessment and
deciding whether specific legislation is called for; focusing attention on the Object Name

Service (ONS) RFID database system, since "abuse of data in the ONS could severely
endanger the personal privacy of millions of American citizens"; and publishing and
disseminating "documents that educate the general public about RFID technology and
with the purpose of educating businesses about the importance of protecting consumers'
privacy." Also provided by EPIC (2004b) was the Guidelines on Commercial Use of
RFID Technology, with prohibitions against tracking individuals and snooping through
the reading of tags on or with individuals, so as not to generate consumer profiles, even if
they are assigned anonymously. Also prohibited is the coercion of consumers to leave the
tags functioning in order to derive certain benefits otherwise not available including
"...warranty tracking, loss recovery, or compliance with smart appliances (EPIC 2004b)."
Whatever guidelines or recommendations are followed, if the RFID industry does
not voluntarily adopt standards that pacify the concerns of consumers and privacy
advocates, it is likely these groups will demand regulations on this technology. Garfinkel
(2004) feels there is the danger that "high-handed actions on the part of WID-advocates
will likely empower consumer activists and their legislative allies to pass some truly
stifling legislation." This reaction could serve to greatly limit or postpone many potential
applications of this technology in the near future. As Plichta (2004) says, "a balance must
be struck between a laissez-faire approach that might let tracking information abuse run
amuck and a government regulation approach that might stifle this economically and
technologically beneficial technology." In his proposed guidelines prepared for the
Electronic Privacy Information Center, Plichta (2004) specifies three areas to consider in
meeting this balance: Duties of a User Employing RFID Systems That Do Not Gather
Data About Individuals; Duties of a User Employing RFID Systems That Can Gather

Personal Data About Individuals; and Rights of an Individual When RFID Systems Are
Used. Specifically relating to location privacy is the guideline that the user of an RFID
system will not "track the movement of individuals via tagged items." That user should
also not "record or store tag data from tags that do not belong to the user, or from tags
that have been already purchased (Plichta 2004)," which would serve to limit somewhat
the continuous acquisition of consumer data from tags and prevent an all-out invasive
personal search by RFID readers every time one entered an RFID equipped grocery store
for instance.
According to Plichta (2004), the "most sound approach to addressing privacy
concerns will have to examine each kind of tracking within a specific context, and a
context that is developed enough to provide concrete, substantive solutions to burgeoning
privacy risks." His feeling is that general guidelines may work for now, as they "provide
an approach that is at the same time not over-inclusive, because it does not brush over the
unique issues within each context, and not under-inclusive, because it deals, on a general
level, with issues that come up (to some extent) within each context." With advances
from current "speculative" to future "concrete" scenarios of RFID use, however, the need
to deal with privacy concerns arising within certain contexts through more specific
regulations may be necessary (Plichta 2004).

5.1.3 Evaluating Legal Approaches
One major problem faced in the regulation of evolving technology is that laws
often lag behind rapid advancements in the technology. Ideas that seemed unthinkable or
"far-fetched" in the recent past may occur quickly. As Barry Steinhardt (2004) remarks,

"if we at the ACLU have learned anything over the past decade, it is that seemingly
distant privacy invasions that sound right out of science fiction often become real far
faster than anyone has anticipated." It is especially difficult to legislate for possibilities
that may not even have been envisioned yet. However, if a technology is saddled with too
much regulation early in its development, this may impede creativity and progress within
the field.
The various legal approaches mentioned in the previous section have not worked
so far in a U.S. context for related areas. U.S. privacy laws have tended to focus more "on
industry-specific uses of information, like credit reports or medical data, rather than on
protecting the privacy of the individuals in the databases" and therefore are unable to
effectively deal with increasing data mining techniques (Zeller 2005). The U.S. has been
reluctant to provide many controls within the location privacy arena or even regarding
data mining, although recent data security breaches that put at risk the personal
information of tens of millions of individuals have given rise to increasing proposals of
personal information privacy legislation. Time will tell whether any real privacy
protections will be enacted.
Business concerns tend to triumph over consumer privacy concerns within the
U.S. Along with the possibility of little or no additional privacy legislation; there is also
the danger that U.S. businesses may themselves some day insist on legislation for specific
technology such as RFID, demanding legislative protections against disabling or
deactivating tags for instance (Rotenberg 2003). As the full import of RFID technology
becomes apparent and even more uses are discovered in the future, businesses likely will

fight hard to retain or regain control of the potential information gold mine associated
with use of RFID technology.
"Opt-in" approaches to privacy protection are probably unworkable in the current
pro-commercial speech legal climate existing in the U.S. The court held in US West Inc.
v. FCC (1999) that the FCC's interpretation of 47 U.S.C. 9222 as requiring explicit
customer consent before third party disclosure of customers' personal information was a
violation of the First Amendment right of free speech. Use of customer information in
commercial transactions was considered commercial speech and therefore protected by
the First Amendment (White 2003).
Previous sections have discussed the idea of applying fair information practices in
the use of RFID technology. There was some question as to how well this would work.
One problem arises in considering the initial purpose in collecting data and the
subsequent use of that data, dealing with the practices of purpose speczjkation and use

limitation. A group or individual could be collecting data over an extended time period
trying to find correlations between individuals and events, for example general
surveillance data to facilitate the link between individuals and certain crimes. If this were
the case, the initially stated purpose could last indefinitely, with no time limit on data
collection, or on the use and retention of the collected data. In order to make inferences
from the data and to include updates so as to allow new inferences, continuous data
collection would be necessary.
In order to enforce the principle of notice it is essential to know who is collecting
the data. The issue involves not only who ultimately owns the data, but also who has
access to or control over it. Control over tag data may depend in part upon the context of

tag ownership. As ownership relates to WID-embedded personal products, the user may
have total control of all tag functions, whereas in the context of a rented item, the user
might only have the right to read a tag (Weis 2003). If anyone can collect data, for
instance through rogue readers either skimming tag data or eavesdropping on
communications, then there seems little hope of enforcing the notice principle. Since
readers could be hidden almost anywhere, there would be unlimited opportunity to collect
data and no way of knowing if it is even being done, unless notice is provided or a device
capable of detecting reader activity is possessed.
Also inherent in ownership uncertainty is the question of who will be responsible
for following the fair information practices of security, access, accuracy, and
accountability. This is important considering the staggering amount of data that may
potentially be generated by RFID readers. According to one estimate Wal-Mart alone
may generate over seven terabytes of RFID data each day once the technology has been
deployed within its stores (Laurant 2004). For EPCglobal tags embedded within items
such as consumer products and packaging, the plan is to store the tag data, data that
perhaps spans the life of a tag, within the ONS, a database system accessible through the
Internet. According to Cedric Laurant (2004) of the Electronic Privacy Information
Center (EPIC), "if information in this database is associated with personally identifiable
information, the potential for abuses of consumer data and individual privacy will dwarf
any technology previously in use." This is especially of concern as security breaches
relating to personal information are on the increase and become ever more lucrative.
Acceptance of "voluntary industry-approved privacy" standards has been
proposed as one privacy solution. However, as Garfinkel (2004) says, the "problem is

they're voluntary, businesses don't have to comply with them." But if there were a strong
enough incentive to do so, that might change industry thinking. According to Morgan and
Newton (2004), one way to provide privacy and anonymity protections for technology
systems is to "promote the growth of effective system design standards." After
development of performance standards, if system designers were persuaded to follow
these "as a matter of good professional practice," and certification was developed to
identify businesses that were complying with the standards, then these standards for best
professional practice and certification, which had proved their worth, might become law
(Morgan and Newton 2004). According to Morgan and Newton (2004), "if laws were
passed that limit the extent and circumstances under which persons and their actions
could be identified via automated systems in public places, and this information shared
with others, then this would provide a basis for parties to sue system operators, providers,
and designers when abuses occurred. That, in turn, would create a strong incentive on the
part of designers to design systems in which abuse was difficult or impossible."
Attempting to regulate the collection, processing, storage, and use of RFID data to
prevent abuse of personal information is a formidable task. The preceding information
has shown that as respects location privacy, and especially as relating to RFID
technology, fair information practices may be hard to enforce, and other legislative,
regulatory, or guideline approaches to protecting personal privacy do not wholly work.

Table 1. Summary of legal approaches to RFID-related privacy protection.
Current State of
Potential Problems

Implementation or
Support

If voluntary, cannot force
businesses to comply
Industry guidelines
Without incentives to do so,
businesses may not want to
comply
Unworkable within current U.S.
pro-commercial speech climate

'

1

Technologicallyneutral baseline
privacy legislation

Provides only a minimum level
of protection
One-size-fits-all approach
Excessive early regulation can
stifle creativity and growth in the
field

R i I D specific
privacy legislation

RFID guidelines have been
created in the U.S. and various
other countries, but are not widely
implemented
Past attempts were ruled as
violating U.S. corporate free
speech rights

U.S. law focuses more on
protecting specific privacy
invasions and does not generally
support baseline privacy
legislation

Numerous U.S. states are
considering or have attempted
to pass R F ~ Dlegislation (&,
Laws often lag behind rapid
Wisconsin has banned the
advancements in technology
forcible implantation of RFID
chips in humans), however, most
Enforcement of a law may not be attempted laws have failed to pass
possible without enabling

5.2 Technological Approaches
Numerous solutions for providing location privacy through technological means
have been proposed. This section provides an overview of some of these approaches,
both as to location privacy in general and specifically relating to W I D technology. The
section also evaluates the technological methods of protecting privacy, as well as
discusses how to promote privacy considerations during the design stage.

5.2.1 General Location Privacy
Duckham and Kulik (2005) recommend obfuscation as a means of privacy
protection. Obfuscation involves degrading information quality. Their framework
attempts to balance "an ind.ividual's need for high-quality information services against
that individual's need for location privacy," recognizing there is a tradeoff between the
two. The "obfuscation architecture allows an individual to connect directly with a thirdparty location-based service provider, without the need to use a broker or other
intermediary," for example a cell phone company (Duckham and Kulik 2005).
Gruteser et al. (2003) suggest an approach where data is anonymized within the
sensor network before storage. Therefore, the opportunity for misuse of the data by
service providers or others who may gain unauthorized access to the stored data is
minimized. System design includes a hierarchy of sensor nodes, with anonymity by
means of cloaking either the node ID or the data obtained from the node. So an
individual's exact location could be known but not his identity, or his identity could be
known but not his exact location.

The system proposed by Beresford and Stajano (2003) operates by changing user
pseudonyms when entering into a mix zone from an application zone. A mix zone for a
specific group of individuals is "a connected spatial region of maximum size in which
none of these users has registered any application callback," whereas an application zone
is "an area where a user has registered for a callback." The privacy level provided by a
particular mix zone at any one time depends in part on the size of the anonymity set; the
anonymity set being defined as "the group of people visiting the mix zone during the
same time period." The smaller the anonymity set, the lower the privacy level that is
available. Users are able to choose the minimum set size at which they will agree to
release location updates.
One problem with user pseudonymity and anonymity is that even though an
individual's identity may not be directly linked to location data, through data mining
identity may be inferred (Duckham and Kulik 2005). If records are retained for extended
time periods, allowing tracing of past routes - to home, work, etc. - patterns will become
discernable and from these identification may be possible (Zevenbergen 2004). Although
anonymity may be desirable, as Langheinrich (2002a) states, "unless we want to abandon
our current social interactions completely and deal only behind digital pseudonyms in
virtual reality with each other, we must realize that our real-world presence cannot be
completely hidden, nor perfectly anonymized." In fact, applications that required
authentication and personalization would be difficult in the face of anonymity (Duckham
and Kulik 2005).
Langheinrich (2002a) offers the privacy awareness system (paws), composed of a
device, the privacy assistant, that can detect sensors operating and collecting data within

an area and a privacy-aware database (pawDB) that stores the collected data. This system
is a "privacy-enabler" not a "privacy protector.'' It operates based upon a principle similar
to one used by democratic societies: "to give people the ability to respect other people's
safety, property, or privacy, and to rely on corresponding social norms, legal deterrence,
and law enforcement to create a reasonable expectation that people will follow such
rules." The system is "targeted at ubiquitous computing environments that allows data
collectors to both announce and implement data usage policies, as well as providing data
subjects with technical means to keep track of their personal information as it is stored,
used, and possibly removed from the system." The privacy policies are based on a P3P
set up. Users are able to set their own privacy preferences using a language such as
APPEL, these preferences are automatically compared to the privacy policy of a service
or data collector, so that acceptability can be determined or the user can be prompted for
a decision if one cannot automatically be made (Langheinrich 2002a).
The system proposed by Myles et al. (2003) employs LocServ, a "middleware
service that lies between location-based applications and location-tracking technologies"
and which allows use of various positioning technologies. Their system uses policy
language that extends the P3P language. Unlike P3P, the system "does not require
policies to specify the data to be collected, because the system can determine it from the
associated query." The system differs from Langhenrich's paws system in that "paws
lets users protect their privacy at the moment of information capture, typically when they
access a service or enter a new geographic space," whereas this system "attempts to
provide privacy checks at the moment of information release

-

that is, when an

application makes a solicited or unsolicited request for location information (Myles et al.
2003)."

5.2.2 RFID Specific
Due to the limited computing ability of passive RFID tags, it is difficult to apply
security protections like encryption. However, according to Juels (2006), the very
simplicity of RFID tags is one reason that technological methods can be employed in
protecting privacy with this type of technology. Unlike the vulnerability of a computer
with Internet access and employing various software applications, "an RFID tag interacts
with external devices in a constrained manner" and being without software "it draws on a
small set of fixed protocols for communication (Juels 2006)." Some of the proposed
technological approaches to RFID-related privacy protection are outlined below.

5.2.2.1 Tags with Pseudonyms
According to Juels (2006), to lessen the threat of tracking, rather than containing a
single unique ID, tags could hold a few "unlinkable" IDS or pseudonyms, perhaps
responding with a different pseudonym at each scan. So two scans, one at each end of a
street or mall, would produce two different ID numbers, thereby limiting the ability to
track an individual as she moves through her daily activities. Depending on the spacing
of readers and the number of individuals within that specific area at one time, it may be
fairly easy to infer that the pseudonyms are linked to the same tag. Also, if all the
pseudonyms could be "harvested" through "repeated, rapid-fire scanning," this privacy
protection technique would fail. One solution would be to put a delay circuit into the tag,

so as to delay the transmission of a new pseudonym for several minutes after the tag is
scanned (Juels 2006).

5.2.2.2 Faraday Cage

Use of a Faraday cage to shield a tag from reader interrogation has been offered
as a possible means of protecting tag data. This involves encasing a tag in material like
metal foil or mesh, thus protecting the tag from the reader's radio signals (Juels et al.
2003; Bono et al. 2005). A problem with Faraday cages or shielding is the temporary
nature of the device. A tag is only protected fiom a reader's interrogation as long as it's
inside the shielding material. Shielding is also not practical for many applications. For
instance, shielding material cannot be worn over clothing with embedded tags (Working
Party 29 2005). It would also not prevent "passive eavesdropping (Bono et al. 2005)."

5.2.2.3 Hash Functions

One fairly low-cost approach to RFID tag security, and potential privacy
protection, is the use of a one-way hash function for controlling access to tags. One-way
hash functions are difficult to invert and therefore may prevent tag reading by
unauthorized readers. The owner can lock a tag by choosing a random key, computing the
key's hash value and storing it as the tag's metaID, which is then stored along with the
key in a backend database (Sarma et al. 2002; Weis 2003; Weis et al. 2003). Though
spoofing may not be avoided in this method, it may at least be detectable. Hijacking of
tag data is possible when the tag is "unlocked." There is also a potential for tracking
people since the metaID serves as a tag identifier (Weis 2003). Weis et al. (2003) suggest

the possibility of equipping tags with a "random number generator" along with a one-way
hash function to provide additional protection of tag data.

5.2.2.4 Killing, Recoding, and Overwriting
In order to facilitate some of the privacy rights outlined in his RFID Bill of
Rights, Garfinkel (2002) suggested incorporating a "password-protected 'kill' feature"
into the tags, a feature now incorporated into EPCglobal's Class 1 Gen 2 tags. Since the
use of a standardized password could lead to an attempted killing or erasing of the unique
serial numbers of all RFID tags within a store, systems to sense such activity could be
employed. Informing consumers of the use of a reader could be accomplished by a
prominently displayed written notice, or by having the reader or tag emit a flashing light
or tone (Garfinkel 2002; Weinberg 2004). In addition, if consumers possessed "reader
detectors" that included real-time clocks and positioning technology like GPS, noncompliant RFID system users could be identified (Garfinkel 2002). Weis (2003) suggests
that RFID-enabled cell phones and PDAs could be used to "monitor, log and filter all
read attempts." Nokia has now developed a cell phone containing an W I D reader, which
according to privacy advocates may provide a "check against RFID tag deployment," not
to slow deployment, but to "give individuals the power to read tags, and to know exactly
what information is being stored (Weiss 2004)."
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (2005) also advocates use of the kill feature,
but goes further in suggesting it should be mandatory for consumer products at the pointof-sale. As the EFF (2005) states, "in the complete absence of a common pool of
knowledge about RFID technology, the privacy-invasive practices it enables, and the

resources necessary to combat abuse, the only effective stopgap measure for protecting
privacy is a "default setting," or architecture, that supports it," namely, mandatory tag
killing.
A number of concerns arise regarding the use of a kill command with RFID tags.
One is that it prevents any further use of the tag, either in a commercial sense or possibly
even the functionality of the tagged item altogether. The RFID Position Statement
(CASPIAN et al. 2003) articulates a number of other concerns, one being that consumers
may be forced to choose between retaining privacy through the killing of tags and
receiving certain benefits and discounts by keeping the tags operational. If it is
inconvenient to kill tags, the consumer may effectually be prevented from disabling them,
whether or not there is an option to do so. Even though tags may be killed at the time of
sale, this still allows for in-store tracking. Also, it may appear that tags have been
"killed," but they may in fact only be "asleep," and have the potential to be reactivated at
a later time. In addition, governmental action based on security threats could lead to the
removal of a "kill" option for tags all together (CASPIAN et al. 2003).
An additional issue related to the kill option arises in applications that involve
borrowing or renting items containing a RFID tag, such as use by libraries or video stores
(Molnar et al. 2005). The RFID tag is needed at the time of item return, so should not be
killed at the time of borrow or rental. Customer records for video stores and libraries are
legally protected since they admittedly pose a substantial privacy risk, but if the tags are
not de-activated and reading of the tags is possible outside the library or store walls, "the
spirit of these laws can be completely circumvented (Molnar et al. 2005)." Molnar et al.

(2005) propose "recoding" or overwriting a tag's ID with a new number "when it changes
hands."
Another possible technique is to simply overwrite tag data with zeros (Working
Party 29 2005.) However, while the tag will only reply to the reader with zeros, the fact
that the tag replies at all to a reader may itself communicate more information than a
consumer may wish to convey. Tags are being embedded into more expensive items to
begin with, thus allowing potential thieves to easily locate more lucrative targets, in
cloakrooms or parking garages for example. One other consequence of overwriting tags
is that "as RFID tags become more numerous, shops may dislike all those tags that
respond to queries, but return junk data (Working Party 29 2005)."

5.2.2.5 Signal-to-Noise Measurement

Fishkin and Roy (2003) propose that tag response to reader queries be dependent
upon the distance a tag is from a reader. They have shown that the distance from a tag to
a reader can be approximated by measuring the signal-to-noise ratio of a reader query. If
the circuitry to measure signal-to-noise ratio were incorporated into the tag a distance
threshold could be set beyond which the tag would not provide any response, it might
transmit its ID number when within a specified distance, or it might require a shorter
distance before reacting to a kill command. Spoofing may be possible if a reader varies
its broadcast power, simulating shorter or longer read distances (Juels 2006).

5.2.2.6 Blocker Tags
Another approach to privacy protection is "active jamming" through a mobile
deyice that constantly broadcasts signals to disrupt reader operation. One major drawback
is the potential to disrupt all reader activity within the locale of the jammer device,
including those for applications not of concern to a user (Juels et al. 2003). Instead, Juels
et al. (2003) suggest "passive jamming" through use of a blocker lag. The blocker tag can
simulate all possible tag serial numbers, called a universal blocker, or simulate only
certain subsets of serial numbers, known as a selective blocker. Weis (2003) had
previously discussed a device to "mimic" tags that might enable the attack of an
inventory-control system.
Tag simulation is accomplished through interference with the singulation protocol
that allows a reader to communicate with a single tag. Used in this case is the "treewalking" singulation protocol which permits a reader "to identify the serial numbers of
nearby tags individually by means of a bit-by-bit query process resembling a depth-first
search of a binary tree (Juels et al. 2003)." A selective blocker seems more appropriate
for consumer use, since a universal blocker would lead to "indiscriminately disrupting"
all readers within an area. Each designated privacy zone "consists of a restricted range of
tag serial numbers targeted for protection (i.e., simulation) by a selective blocker tag."
Singulation, in this case accomplished through a tree-walking algorithm, is disrupted by
the blocker tag once it enters an area designated as a privacy zone (Juels et al. 2003).
One good point about blocker tags is the fairly low implementation cost (Juels et
al. 2003). Little modification would be required to the one or two standard RFID tags
used to make a blocker tag. Once the manufacturing cost of standard RFID tags reaches

five cents, blocker tag cost may be no more than 10 cents. Blocker tags do not require
expensive cryptography and the password to facilitate privacy zone changes is similar to
the password already available for the "kill" command. According to Juels et al. (2003),
blocker tags are effectively as inexpensive an approach as the "kill" command, yet "much
more flexible and useful for protecting privacy."
However, there are some drawbacks relating to the use of blocker tags. One is the
potential for denial-of-service attacks through "malicious blocker tags," attempted
perhaps by shoplifters in a retail setting. Denial-of-service attacks could be detected
simply by setting a threshold for tag ID numbers, which once passed would indicate a
malicious intent. Or tag IDS could be checked against a set range of authentic IDSthrough
connection of the reader to a database, and if the ID fell outside the range, it could be
considered fraudulent (Juels et al. 2003).
Another drawback is that "blocker tags effectively implement an "opt-out"
policy", as consumers must purchase blocker tags to benefit from the protection afforded
by them (Juels 2006). Sqft blocking (Juels and Brainard 2004; Juels 2006) could allow an
"opt-in" approach instead through use of unblocker tags.

This would involve

programming readers to only scan the private zone if an unblocker tag was present.
According to Juels (2006), "a soft blocker tag may be thought of as a physically
embodied privacy policy of sorts," likened to P3P, as it would allow a user to set privacy
preferences that can be compared against a server's privacy policy. A soft blocker could
be composed of a standard RFID tag whose ID number is linked to a user's privacy
policy. Although the "voluntary or internally auditable" nature of the soft blocker may
"offer somewhat weaker privacy enforcement" as compared to an ordinary blocker, it is

also more "flexible" in that it allows "partial or scrubbed data" to be revealed rather,than
the "all-or-nothing policy enforced by a blocker (Juels and Brainard 2004)."
Other potential problems with blocker tags are outlined in the W I D Position
Statement (CASPIAN et al. 2003). To begin with, blocker tags "might encourage the
proliferation of RFID devices by giving consumers a false sense of security." Like the
kill function, blocker tags could be banned by government mandate if deemed necessary
for national security, or even by stores themselves to protect against shoplifting or loss of
marketing data. The ban might be limited to particular areas, or certain types of buildings
such as airports. Blocker tags also put the burden of privacy protection on consumers, to
remember to carry the blocker tags with them, to activate them, and to make sure they are
functioning properly (CASPIAN et al. 2003).

5.2.2.7 Blinded Tree-Walking
Use of a Binary Tree-Walking anti-collision algorithm may leave tag data
transmitted on the stronger reader-to-tag or forward channel open to attack by
eavesdroppers located 100 meters or more away. With Binary Tree-Walking, a reader
broadcasts "every bit of every singulated tag" over the forward channel. To combat the
"long-range eavesdropping" potential on the forward channel, Weis et al. (2003) propose
"Silent Tree-Walking" or "Blinded Tree-Walking" (Weis 2003), useful with a group of
tags sharing a common ID prefix, like a product code or a manufacturer ID. Since the
backward channel has a much weaker signal it cannot be monitored from as great a
distance, so the tag's response to the reader over the tag-to-reader backward channel
would be protected from long-range eavesdroppers. The tag could send the common

prefix to the reader as a "shared secret" over the backward channel and that "shared
secret prefix may be used to conceal the value of the unique portion of the IDS (Weis
2003; Weis et al. 2003)." Close-range eavesdropping of the backward channel would still
be possible. Another possibility is Randomized Tree-Walking in which pseudo-ID bits
are generated and broadcast over the forward channel, although this would involve more
communication costs (Weis et al. 2003).

Table 2. Summary of technological approaches to WID-related privacy protection.
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5.2.3 Evaluating Technological Approaches
One advantage of technological over legal approaches is technology's ability to
automatically enforce privacy measures when integrated into system design. Laws are
often very hard to enforce, and if unenforceable, will not be followed by some without an
anticipated return on their moral investment in compliance. However, it may be difficult
to design a system so that privacy can be enforced and individuals can choose the level of
privacy they desire. Privacy is subjective and therefore may not hold the same degree of
concern for system designers as for consumers. The challenge comes not only in
designing a system to placate the privacy concerns of consumers, but also the demands of
businesses deploying RFID systems, and convincing system designers to be concerned
about these issues in the first place.

5.2.3.1 Privacy by Design
Before technological solutions to privacy can be developed and applied in system
design, implications of system use must be considered to determine what protections are
required. There is, however, some question as to whom the responsibility to contemplate
these issues belongs.
Marc Langheinrich, currently a researcher from the Institute for Pervasive
Computing at ETH Zurich, visited a few European labs that design sensor-based
computing systems and asked designers about the privacy implications related to their
systems. According to Langheinrich, "Most said either 'It's not my business, it's the
lawmakers' or 'It's not my business, because it's not my field.' Others said that if they
thought about privacy, it would get in the way of building their designs." (Kumagai and

Cherry 2004) However, as Langheinrich (2001) argues regarding ubiquitous computing,
"We cannot rely on lawmakers and sociologists to be fully aware of the vast possibilities
and implications that the technology so obviously presents to us." According to
Langheinrich (2002b), to build "systems that will respect the privacy of the individual, it
is crucial to understand when it is exactly that people feel their privacy has been
invaded." Langheinrich applies to ubiquitous computing Marx's (2001) personal border
crossings - natural, social, spatial or temporal, and borders due to ephemeral or transitory
effects - to aid in the determination of potential privacy violations.
According to Morgan and Newton (2004) "if system designers think carefully
about the social consequences of alternative designs before they make their choices, then
the potential for negative social consequences often can be dramatically reduced or
eliminated." They outline a list of principles to be considered in designing systems
involving collection of information relating to individuals within public space.
In designing ubiquitous computing systems, Hong et al. (2004) propose the use of
"privacy risk models as a way of refining privacy from an abstract concept into a set of
concrete concerns for a specific domain and community of users." Their model is twopart. The first "is aprivacy risk analysis that poses a series of questions to help designers
refine their understanding of the problem space," considering particular issues that may
arise in both the "social and organizational context in which an application is embedded
and the technology used in implementing that application." "The second part looks at
privacy risk management, and is a cost-benefit analysis intended to help designers
prioritize privacy risks and develop architectures, interaction techniques, and strategies
for managing those risks (Hong et al. 2004)."

As Beckwith (2003) states, "...successful design requires that we understand the
desires, concerns, and awareness of the technology's users." One attempt to accomplish
this was through a field study of the MyGrocer pervasive retail system (Kourouthanassis
and Roussos 2003) that evaluated consumer perceptions and concerns relating to the
RFID system during its design stage and before actual implementation, so that
modifications could be applied.

5.2.3.2 Conclusions on Technological Approaches
As has been shown, no one technology or perhaps even combination of
technologies, appears to be able to satisfy privacy concerns entirely, as different
applications demand a variety of privacy solutions. Finding workable technological
solutions may not be enough absent laws to enforce these technological approaches, as
industry may not be inclined to make use of them. Generally businesses do what is in
their best interests. If the clamor for privacy becomes loud enough, it may be in the best
interest of businesses to include privacy protections, although it may take longer to
implement if not required from the beginning of the design process.
Legal approaches on their own also fail to deal with the complexities of RFID
technology and enforcement may be near impossible in some instances. Therefore,
exploration of a combined approach to privacy protection seems appropriate.

5.3 Combined Approaches
This section discusses a proposed privacy protection approach that combines legal
safeguards with technology to enforce them. The advantages of a contractual approach to

privacy will also be discussed, along with how this approach could be integrated with
technology to provide autonomous control over personal information.

5.3.1 Application of Fair Information Principles in Design
Applying fair information principles to facilitate privacy protection in the use of
RFID technology was discussed in earlier sections. Floerkemeier et al. (2004) have taken
that a step farther and explain how some of these principles can be incorporated even at
the reader-to-tag protocol level, the communication between the reader and the tag.
Although many of the principles could be carried out through "non-technical means"
(e.g., notice of collection through sign posting), "by incorporating such principles directly
into the underlying protocol, both consumers and data collectors can more easily follow
them, thus strengthening existing legal protection by providing the means to verify and
thus enforce corresponding regulations (Floerkemeier et al. 2004)." Relying on
technology to automatically enforce some of these principles helps to overcome
consumer tendency to not take advantage of available privacy protections when it is
burdensome to do so.
This approach attempts to provide transparency, so that consumers can determine
not only when data collection occurs, but also identify who is collecting the data and
why. To accomplish this, each reader would have a reader policy ID (RPID) to be
included in the inventory command of the reader. This W I D would contain IDS for the
data collector, the policy, and the reader. Providing information on the policy would
assist in dispute resolution, allowing customers to identify which policy was used.
Existing ONS architecture could be used to store and access the policy in question. The

reader's inventory command would also include fields for declaration of purpose, many
of which are similar to the P3P purpose types, and collection types. Floerkemeier et al.
(2004),outline fifteen purposes and four collection practices applicable in this system.
The system would work in a fashion similar to P3P. As a web browser compares
personal preferences of a user against the privacy policies of a website and then
automatically acts for the consumer, the reader-to-tag protocol would allow automatic
decisions as to whether to release tag data when queried by a reader, based upon privacy
preferences of the user. This should serve to ease consumer burden as well as providing
the consumer with autonomous control over release of personal information
(Floerkemeier et al. 2004).
Transparency or tag detection is facilitated through use of a watchdog tag, which
is a standard tag including a battery, screen, and possibly a long-range communication
channel. The possibility exists for incorporating this technology into a mobile phone,
rather than necessitating a separate device. With incorporation of the fair information
principles into the protocol, the watchdog tag can not only detect a reader, but can decode
reader commands and display them on the screen so that a user is provided notice of
collection specifics such as time and date of collection, data collector, applicable policy,
reader ID and location, purpose, collection type, and target selection. The watchdog tag is
also able to keep track of all transfers of data, enabling users to obtain summaries of the
data collected on them. The data logs could be accessed through the ONS (Floerkemeier
et al. 2004).
The above system provisions accomplish application of the principles of purpose
speczjication, openness, and accountability. Collection limitation is provided through the

use of a selection mask, with the goal of targeting only the tags relevant to the current
collection type. If readers were integrated into a privacy-aware database such as paws
(Langheinrich 2002a), the principles of use limitation, data quality, and participation
would be implemented. Incorporating selective jamming or blocking capabilities into the
watchdog tag, would allow a consumer to give or withhold explicit consent. By providing
the capability to look up the reader's ID number online, a user can decide whether or not
to jam the reader signals. It may also be possible to enforce the principle of security
through incorporating measures such as cryptography into the tags, facilitating the
creation of an ID certification system, and helping prevent the theft of a reader's
identification string. Registration of a company's identification string would be required
(Floerkemeier et al. 2004).
Several concerns arise in use of this approach. One is the cost as far as system
performance. Extensions to the current protocol would have some effect on performance,
but the potential time delay appears to be "within acceptable limits", varying with the
data transfer rate of a system, and in some cases would be compensated for by shorter
reply times due to the capability of selecting only tags of interest (Floerkemeier et al.
2004).
Another concern relates to future and unintended uses of the data collected. For
instance, even though the original purpose for collection may not have included location
tracking, there is still the potential for log files to be combined at a later time. Since this
system allows for the identification, storage, and access to the privacy policies utilized in
any one instance, this provides legal leverage for consumers to pursue non-compliance
claims (Floerkemeier et al. 2004).

5.3.2 Advantages of a Contractual Approach
When attempting to provide data privacy protections Bibas (1994) suggests
pursuit of the "golden mean: a solution tailored to individual preferences and values." In
order to find that "golden mean" a costbenefit analysis is important in order to balance
the potential benefits to be derived from the information industry against the costs of
privacy loss. The value of privacy, however, is subjective and hard to calculate.
Therefore, according to Bibas (1994), "any solution should be sensitive to individual
valuations of the tradeoffs involved instead of giving privacy to everybody or nobody."
A centralized approach to data privacy, whether through legislation, regulations,

state constitutional rights or tort law involves a decision on potential tradeoffs made by
one individual or a few, on behalf of many, providing a one-size-fits-all solution. For
example, a tort approach "requires judges to balance the utility of dissemination against
the value of privacy to a reasonable person ...Any such uniform standard based on the
preferences of a non-existent reasonable person would imperfectly assess and allocate the
social costs of withholding information (Bibas 1994)."
Contracts, however, are the "branch of the common law most sensitive to
individual preferences (Bibas 1994)." In the past, courts have not been overly receptive to
claims of privacy invasion. Privacy is a somewhat intangible concept and very subjective.
Contracts are able to provide a more concrete or tangible basis for cause of action relating
to breach of privacy. Contracts are also more flexible, allowing respect for both majority
and minority preferences. "Flexibility is the market's forte: the pricing mechanism is
extremely sensitive to variations in valuations and quickly adjusts to them," and so "a

contractual approach, by pricing information, would thus more efficiently allocate data
than would a centrally planned solution (Bibas 1994)."
"Classical" contract law does not provide a total privacy solution though, for
people many times do not have the bargaining power or leverage to renegotiate standard
form contracts. A single business cannot absorb all start-up costs relating to new
standards and still realize "profit advantages." (Bibas 1994; Onsnld 200 1) In addition,
new standards may be opposed aggressively by other industry players with heavily vested
interests, no matter how beneficial these standards may prove to be for society as a whole
(Onsrud 200 1).
Applying a contractual approach to privacy protections for location-based
services, Onsrud (2001) proposes combining computer code with a uniform model
contract. (Bhaduri and Onsrud 2002; Bhaduri 2003) Industry adherence to such a model
contract might be gained through methods such as providing government funding for
initial open source computer code by means of contracts or grants, as well as hinging
eligibility for permits, tax incentives, or program funding on adherence to the model
contract. This combined "standard contractlcode approach" is beneficial for privacy as it
would "encourage companies to collect only minimum information to perform services.. .
otherwise many consumers would not sign up for the service (Onsrud 2001)."

5.3.3 Contractual Approach for Location-Based Services
Bhaduri (2003) believes that "it is possible to develop an approach for protecting
privacy in the use of location-based services that supports the core ethical principle of
autonomy of the individual." A combined technological and legal model would enable

consumers to assume control over their own location privacy, rather than leaving this
responsibility to service providers (Bhaduri and Onsrud 2002). This type of approach
would, be preferable to laws that address specific standards, as these do not provide the
flexibility necessary to allow individuals to choose their own privacy level, and "onesize-fits all privacy protection is both economically and socially inefficient since the
ability to adapt to specific circumstances is non-existent (Bhaduri 2003)."
Using a model contract applied across industry, a dynamic based approach to
privacy protection is possible, with consumer choice facilitated through use of a
"personal communicator" (Onsrud 2001) device. This device would enable a "continuous
contractual environment" (Bhaduri and Onsrud 2002) in which a consumer's personal
preferences could be changed "on-the-fly", allowing her to "opt-in" or "opt-out" of these
preferences at will.
Preferences may be set individually for each category relating to a particular
group or entity, or even individually for each member of a group, whether a business
associate, friend, family member, or other. Through menu options, users choose whom
they will allow to track or communicate with them, when, and how. For example, choices
can be made regarding the accuracy to which others can track the user in time and space,
the acceptance of push or pull services from clients, or the granting of permission for
servers to use or distribute personal information (Bhaduri 2003).
Bhaduri (2003) feels that "by providing a single contractual model for all LBS
servers a level playing field is created for all users, whether rich or poor." He asserts that
giving users control of their own privacy would create the desired market and therefore
the desired profits required to entice the location based service industry to adopt this

model. Bhaduri envisions that many users would be willing to surrender some of their
privacy in exchange for service price reductions. By including the ability to make
instantaneous privacy level changes, this would facilitate dynamic pricing and billing,
allowing charges to be based on time usage at a certain level or the extent of the
marketing conducted at that level.
Bhaduri (2003) mentions several potential concerns relating to implementation of
this model. One concern deals with the way database management systems are designed.
These systems are modeled for static rather than dynamic data (Sistla et al. 1997) and
therefore database system redesign may be required in order for this model to function
effectively. Another concern relates to the costs associated with implementing this model,
not only monetary cost, but also technical costs in terms of computational efficiency and
communication. With continuous advances in the computing field, the feasibility of
system implementation will increase.

Chapter 6
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR LOCATION PRIVACY PROTECTION
WITHIN RFID ENVIRONMENTS IN A U.S. CONTEXT

After consideration of the current and likely near future pro-commercial speech
legal climate in the United States, as well as the various proposed legal and technological
approaches to location privacy protection outlined in chapter five, several potential
avenues through which to pursue privacy protection in the use of RFID technology
present themselves. One approach is to let technological systems that protect autonomy
of the individual, by allowing individuals to continually reset their own privacy
preferences, to compete in the marketplace against those systems that do not protect
privacy. The problem with this approach is that the public is unlikely to become fully
informed of the ramifications of their choices due to the complexity of the technologies
and issues. As a result, the company that fails to protect autonomy of the individual in
privacy decision-making may gain a substantial economic advantage in the marketplace.
A second approach would be to pass legislation stating that companies may not link the

W I D tags to any activity of the individual unless the concerned individual explicitly
"opts-in" to being tracked. This approach by itself creates a very heavy corporate burden
in incentivizing people to "opt-in" and is subject to constitutional validity challenges
under corporate freedom of speech concepts. Further, in the past, after a party has "optedin" the commercial sector has been loath to make it easy for the party to ever "opt-out." A
third approach would be to pass legislation or create regulations that place limits on the
collection of data and the use of that data by businesses or other entities. A general ban
on the collection of RFID data would stifle the development of useful applications and ad

hoc legislative approaches have been problematic in providing reasonably comprehensive
solutions. A fourth approach might be to develop a standard universal contract to be
applied across industry, combining both legal and technological means of protecting
privacy. A fifth approach might be to use a specific combination of two or more of the
above options. Ultimately a recommendation is given for a legislative ban on the tying of
RFID tags' unique ID numbers to individuals if they have explicitly expressed a desire
not to be tracked and to ameliorate the negative impacts of this approach by developing
technology to gain permission to track interactively in specific circumstances enabled
through private contract law.

6.1 Legislation
Under current U.S. law, businesses and other data collectors are not prevented
from reading RFID tags, enabling them to potentially link the tag's unique ID number
with other personal information, as well as providing tag location and therefore personal
location at that moment in time. Although numerous attempts at privacy legislation have
been made at both federal and state levels, relating to data collection in general and RFID
data collection specifically, passing any type of workable consumer privacy protection
legislation has proven to be very difficult.
Laws specifically restricting data collection procedures are possible, but appear
unlikely in the near future in the current legislative climate. By applying guidelines such
as the Fair Information Principles (Federal Trade Commission) to the collection and use
of WID-derived data and including those guidelines within specific RFID legislation,
location privacy protection could be enhanced. However, the Fair Information Principles

have never been imposed by legislative mandate against the commercial sector in the
U.S., as contrasted for instance with European legislation. Proposed legislation such as
the Location Privacy Act of 2001, discussed in section 5.1 .l, would not only have
required notice to customers of intended data uses of location data by location-based
service providers, but would also have required an "opt-in" rule for use of the data. That
is, the tracking of location of individuals would not have been allowed unless each
individual expressly affirmed that he was allowing himself to be tracked. However, such
an "opt-in" approach is unlikely to withstand close constitutional scrutiny, as past court
rulings have supported corporate flexibility to choose among competing economic
models under free speech principles.
Supreme Court decisions on First Amendment issues of free speech were not
always favorable to corporations. In fact, the court reversed its original stance that the
speech of corporations is not protected under the First Amendment (Valentine v.
Chrestensen (1942)). Vibbert (1990) outlines the court's progression towards ever
increasing corporate rights of free speech through six cases, beginning with Bigelow v.
Virginia (1975) and ending with Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. Public Utilities
Commission of California (1986). Based upon analysis of those six cases, Vibbert (1990)
goes on to speculate that "the increasing perception of corporations as social agents with
the speech rights attendant to actors (if not to individuals) seems likely." Since that time,
courts have continued to rule in favor of corporate free speech, to the point of declaring
in U.S. West Inc. v. FCC (1999) that all or nothing "opt-in" rules requiring consent from
customers before disclosure of personal information to third parties are an infringement
on free speech rights. The court found that customer information used in commercial

transactions is considered commercial speech and therefore afforded protection under the
First Amendment. The strong position of the court on the issue of corporate free speech
suggests that unless a constitutional amendment is created that provides a basis for "optin" rules or the court begins to develop a countervailing "human right" that could prevail
over corporate free speech rights in the event of conflicts (Black 19971, these rules will
continue to retain an unconstitutional status.
An all or nothing "opt-out" approach might be facilitated through legislation
providing rights such as those outlined in Garfinkel's (2002) RFID Bill of Rights,
discussed in section 5.1.2. These rights include, among others, the right of the purchaser
of a RFID containing item to remove, deactivate, or destroy a tag, actions which would
require knowledge that a W I D tag was present in the item to begin with. Technology
could be used to enforce these rights and limit data collection without actually removing
or destroying the tags. If a business can alter a tag at the point of sale to indicate that the
item containing it has been sold, the technology obviously exists so that a tag could be
altered to disallow tracking of the purchased item. Altering a tag might include the option
of never being tracked, by "killing" the tag outright, or perhaps being able to set the tag
to "sleep" mode, so that it can be reawakened for use by the individual when and if she so
desires. There is also the possibility of designating the tag as allowing tracking or not
allowing tracking, perhaps by overwriting a default number that is stored in the tag's
memory. The number could be overwritten at the time of purchase through use of a
device or machine located within the store or at any time by an individual if she
possessed a device allowing her to alter the tag. Or, the device could simply overwrite the
unique portion of the tag ID number so that only general (i.e. a jar of Acme strawberry

jam) and no specific identifying data (i.e. this unique jar of Acme strawberry jam) was
stored in the tag. Industry itself could provide the means for deactivating tags without
being forced through legislation. IBM has introduced the "clipped tag" designed so that
the antenna can be scratched off, torn off along perforated edges, or peeled off (IBM
2005). The drawback of destroying tags is that consumers would thereby also lose the
substantial benefits of RFID tags for their own personal use. All or nothing approaches
seem very inefficient from both economic and technological perspectives.

6.2 Assumptions Regarding Future RFID Environments
Although RFID technology is currently being employed in numerous settings,
particularly in supply chain management, full scale deployment into many commercial
and noncommercial sectors is still a future event. At present there is no way to know
exactly in what form or to what extent the implementation of RFID technology will occur
in the future. Without this knowledge it is necessary to make some assumptions regarding
a future RFID environment.
One assumption is that RFID tags will be embedded within most, if not all,
consumer products in the near future. As the benefits of RFID technology become clearly
apparent to businesses, no doubt more businesses will invest in RFID implementation. In
some cases, a supplier's customer base may depend upon whether the supplier decides to
employ RFID technology, such as suppliers to the U.S. Department of Defense or WalMart. If the potential exists for massive data collection through myriad tags, the
likelihood of increased attempts to collect, record, and aggregate the data is high, perhaps
resulting in the installation of myriad RFID readers throughout our daily environment. If

this occurs, attempts to control the data collection are also likely. Were RFID technology
implementation to unfold in this manner, it is not difficult to envision a world where
RFID readers are located on every street corner and at every building entrance, and RFID
signal jammers are carried by almost every person. If the demand for privacy protecting
technology became great enough, the cost of such devices as jammers could become
quite affordable to the general populace, and would likely be a very desirable acquisition
and carried on key chains or included as features on cell phones. In turn, the proliferation
of jamming devices would likely motivate the market to seek out a universal contract
model solution in order to allow the collection of data not otherwise obtainable.
Alternatively, companies might seek legislation banning the use of jamming devices. If
data linking is limited through establishment of a Do Not Link Registry, an incentive is
created for market acceptance of use of a standard contract model to allow users to "optin" and "opt-out" on-the-fly.
Another assumption, based on past experience and the current data collection
frenzy, is that at some point the majority of RFID systems will become interoperable.
Currently each business may implement their own RFID system, based on their particular
needs. Many companies are merely trying to get a system up and running and may be
more concerned with cost than ensuring their system is compatible with other systems.
With the potential for massive amounts of data to be collected through RFID tags, it is in
the interest of businesses to have access to as much data as possible. So although these
systems may not initially be set up as interoperable, and the current focus of individual
businesses may not be on interoperability, past lessons indicate that interoperability is a
likely reality for the future.

This is exemplified through the rise of the Visa corporation from the midst of the
"self-destructive" credit card industry of the late 1960s to an immensely successful
member corporation today. In the 1960s banks began franchising credit cards to licensee
banks around the country, and those licensees, in an effort to compete against each other,
issued massive numbers of credit cards, with the result that "fraud was rampant, and the
banks were hemorrhaging red ink (Waldrop 1996)." In an effort to stop the
hemorrhaging, Dee Hock, the newly appointed CEO of National Bank Americard, Inc.
(later Visa International), implemented his vision for a "chaordic" organization, one that
encouraged "as much competition and initiative as possible throughout the organization "chaos"

- while

bu.ilding in mechanisms for cooperation

-

"order" (Waldrop 1996)." So

while banks were competing for customers, they also had to cooperate on issues such as
implementing a set of common operating standards and a standard card layout, enabling
merchants to "be able to take any Visa card issued by any bank, anywhere." "This
harmonious blend of cooperation and competition is what allowed the system to expand
worldwide in the face of different currencies, languages, legal codes, customs, cultures,
and political philosophies (Waldrop 1996)." Likewise, although RFID can provide
undeniable benefits to a particular business even without interoperability, the potential
increase in benefits to the commercial sector as a whole will push for compatible
systems. To design RFID systems and tags for interoperability, common standards are
required. This becomes an issue when comparing U.S., European, and other countries'
RFID technology. Currently EPCglobal specifications are not compatible with IS0
standards. However, work on integrating EPCglobal specifications into an IS0 RFID
standard has begun and is supported by the Department of Defense (DOD 2006), who

along with Wal-Mart is requiring suppliers to employ RFID technology. Movement
towards global interoperability of RFID technology is under way through deployment of
the new EPC Class 1 Gen 2 RFID technology, creating the potential for tracking tags
from the U.S. throughout Europe (Byteandswitch 2005).
While the EPC Class 1 Gen 2 standard does include access-controlled memory
requiring a password or PIIT to read and write to some memory locations, this is an
optional feature. Due to the added expense of this feature, many businesses will no doubt
opt not to include this capability on their RFID tags. Additionally, EPC tags "release their
identifiers and product information - known as EPC codes - in a promiscuous manner.
Any reader may scan any EPC tag; no access control exists on EPC codes (Bailey and
Juels 2006)." Data can be stored on tags in an encrypted form, however, the Gen 2
standard does not provide for encrypting data being transmitted from tag to reader.
According to Juels of RSA Laboratories, the small size of the Gen 2 chip makes secure
cryptography for Gen 2 tags doubtful (OYConnor2005). Even when the capability to
control access to or lock certain areas of chip memory exists, these areas may not be
locked due to a lack of understanding of chip functioning on the part of business users or
because of the frequent need to update the stored data, leaving the chips "open to hacking
(Newitz 2006)."

6.3 Combined Legal and Technological Approach: "Opt-In" Versus "Opt-Out"
Assumption 1: An extension of the current development directions of RFID

technologies indicates that anyone with an RFID reader will be able to read most passive
RFID tags. Currently, most passive tags are not encrypted and the market for growth in

their usage suggests that the greatest economic benefits will come from their continued
open access (e.g. GPS - There was a time when only surveyors and the military used the
system because it was "closed").
Asstimption 2: Every surveillance camera in the future will have a built in RFID
reader. Technologically it will be possible to match up the tags sensed with the specific
person that purchased the items.
Assumption 3: A large proportion of the population would like to be able to
control which RFID tags may be linked to their identity, tracked over time and under
what circumstances. That is, RFID tags that they carry with them in the clothes or other
items that they have purchased.
Research Question: Assuming this emerging technological environment, how
might this control by each individual be implemented legally and technologically?

6.3.1 Mandating "Opt-In"
Under this approach a federal law would be passed stating that no individual,
organization or agency may link data from an RFID tag to any individual without the
express and explicit permission of that individual.
Analysis: Such laws have been passed by Congress in the past and held to violate
corporate free speech rights. Unless the U.S. Supreme Court changes direction, the only
way to override their previous rulings would be to pass a constitutional amendment. An
amendment highly likely to allow the imposition of "opt-in" laws on the corporate sector
might read as follows:

Human Rights Amendment: Humans shall have a right to life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness while corporations and other legally constructed
entities shall not.

If a large majority of voters and legislators found privacy to be supportive of their wellbeing and happiness, the free speech rights of corporations would be insufficient to
override these constitutional rights of humans and "opt-in" legislation would clearly be
constitutionally supported. The likelihood of a U.S. constitutional amendment clearly
evoking human rights over corporate rights in the near future is doubtful.

6.3.2 Do Not Link Registry: "Opt-Out" Options
Another possible way to facilitate control over the collection and use of RFID
data is through a means similar to the National Do Not Call Registry (FTC 2005)
established under regulations created by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal
Communications Commission. The goal of such a Do Not Link Registry would be to
provide individuals an efficient method for "opting-out" of having their actions
monitored without their permission, an approach that has been held to not violate
corporate free speech rights. The registry would probably be created and run by a
government agency or NGO established for the purpose, and registration would be
possible through a website, by a telephone call, or perhaps at a town office or other public
office. This registry could be set up through a variety of options. The following four
options are analyzed in this section:

Option 1: "Opting-Out" Completely
Option 2: "Opting-Out" But "Opting-In" When Desired by the Individual:
Identity Checking by Businesses
Option 3: "Opting-Out" But "Opting-In" When Desired by the Individual:
Identity Checking at Registration by the Registry
Option 4: "Opting-Out" But "Opting-In" When Desired by the Individual:
Relying on Identity Checking at Registration by Credit Card Companies
Within the context of each option an exploration is carried out on how registration might
be accomplished and how the purchase transaction might proceed.

6.3.2.1 Option 1: "Opting-Out" Completely

A law is passed stating that if individuals have placed their names on the Do Not
Link list, companies may not link their identities to uniquely identifiable items they
purchase or link their identities to other RFID observations when observed elsewhere.

6.3.2.1.1 Option 1 Registration Process

A person accesses the registry website and enters her name and address, or
alternatively, calls the registry and provides this information. Upon registering, she would
be assigned a unique ID number. A unique ID number would probably work better than
other potential identifiers, for example a person's name. A name often does not provide a
unique means of identification, and although a name and address could uniquely identify
a person, address information might need to be updated from time to time. An alternate
approach of registering each tag's serial number probably would not be feasible. If tags

became embedded within most or all manufactured goods, the size of the registry of tag
serial numbers would be potentially massive.
Use of a unique number as an identifier may not appeal to some, as they do not
want another national ID number in addition to a social security number. They may fear
the potential function creep, that the unique number might be employed for uses not
originally intended, as happened with the social security number. However, one
company, Seisint, has already assigned a unique identifying number to every adult citizen
of the United States in order to gather and link data regarding each individual. According
to Poulsen, Seisint's chief technology officer, "data that belongs together is already
linked together (O'Harrow 2005)."
After assignment of the unique ID number, the registrant would then choose a
PIN. The unique ID number and PIN would be stored at the registry (e.g. non-profit or
private organization) in order to verify an identity during a future transaction (e.g.
grocery store purchase). This would be accomplished by means of comparing the PIN
entered at the time of the transaction and the PIN linked to a unique ID number that is
stored at the registry. To facilitate the entry of the unique personal ID number, the
registry would send a card containing the unique ID number within the card's magnetic
strip, similar to the ATM cards issued by banks, which could be swiped at transaction
time to initiate the process of linkage prevention. Alternatively, the registry card could
contain a RFID chip storing the registry ID number, which could be scanned at
transaction time.

6.3.2.1.2 Option 1 Transaction Process
If using cash as payment for the transaction, the purchased items would not be
linked to a specific identity. However, if using a credit card, debit card, loyalty card, or
potentially even a check, an identity could be tied to the items containing RFIDs. Credit
card companies might provide the option of issuing credit cards with a customer's unique
ID number included within the magnetic strip of the card. Banks could do the same with
debit cards issued to their customers, or perhaps even include the unique ID number on
checks. The options discussed here will focus on the use of credit cards and debit cards. If
a person's unique number is not included on the credit or debit card, the person would
need to swipe the card issued to her by the registry. Under current practice, if using a
loyalty card to obtain discounts, a person typically signs away her ability to prevent
linkage to her identity with items purchased. Loyalty card agreements would still be in
effect but the Do Not Link list would now prevent linking to uniquely identifiable objects
(i.e. the store can record you bought a jar of Acme strawberry jam but not link your ID or
name to the specific jar.)
The registry card should be swiped at the start of the transaction process, so that
from the outset it would be known whether linking to the purchased obiect was allowed.
The customer would swipe her registry card, or her credit or debit card that contained her
unique ID number. She would be prompted to enter her registry PIN. The store would
send that PIN along with her unique ID to the registry for comparison with the PIN and
unique ID number stored there in order to verify the customer's identity. If the numbers
matched, this would also serve as verification that she was currently on the registry list.
Verification confirmation would then be transmitted back to the store. If on the list, the

customer's identity could not be linked to the specific objects purchased. If a company
subsequently linked the tags with the person's name without the person's further explicit
permission, the company would be in violation of the law and subject to civil lawsuits for
actual or preferably statutory damages.
Assume later that the purchaser walks by a video surveillance camera with an
RFID reader. The reader would be able to link the store at which items were purchased
and what those items are, if that data was included in tag memory, but not be able to link
the purchaser since the identity was never collected.

6.3.2.1.3 Potential Problems with Option 1

A potential problem arising through use of option 1 is the difficulty or even the
inability to verify the identity of the person registering through the website or on the
telephone. This may lead to an individual using someone else's identity to register for a
unique ID number. This may not seem like a very serious problem if the only use to
which the number can be put is to prevent or allow linking of purchases to a particular
individual. However, if the use of these unique ID numbers was ever expanded to include
a type of national ID number to supplement use of a social security number for instance,
the ability of someone to register under another person's identity becomes more
menacing, creating another potential means of identity theft. A person might register
multiple times under false identities, whether those identities belonged to real or fictional
individuals. Potential solutions could include either checking identity at the time of
purchase or requiring registrants to verify their identities at the start of the registration

process. Methods for carrying out these solutions are discussed below in options, 2
through 4.

6.3.2.2 Option 2: "Opting-Out" But "Opting-In" When Desired by the
Individual: Identity Checking by Businesses

The second option is similar to the first but provides flexibility for the individual
to "opt-in" on the fly for specific items or to receive specific services. Also, the cashier
would be responsible for checking the identity of the customer that uses a registry card or
credit card containing a registry ID number.

6.3.2.2.1 Option 2 Registration Process

For option 2, the registration process would involve the same steps as that of
option 1. Individuals would be able to register through a website or by telephone. Each
individual would enter hislher own name and address, would be assigned a unique ID
number, and then would be able to choose a PIN. A registry card wou.ld be sent to the
individual.

6.3.2.2.2 Option 2 Transaction Process

As with option 1, the customer would swipe her registry card or credit card
containing the unique registry number at the beginning of the transaction process. After
entering her PIN, the PIN along with her unique number would be sent to the registry to
verify her identity and that she is on the registry list. For additional verification, the
cashier could check the customer's identity, comparing the customer's name on the Do

Not Link Registry card to another form of identification, such as a license or credit card.
This process seems less than ideal, as each additional step of the transaction only adds to
its le,ngth and complexity. In addition, just comparing names would not rule out the
possibility of someone with an identical name using the registry card. Even comparing
the ID number were it printed on the registry card to another card on which the number is
printed makes the process more cumbersome. A better solution to verifying identity
might be through means of options 3 or 4.
If at the checkout in purchasing an item the individual is in the Do Not Link
Registry, the customer would be given the choice of whether to allow linking in this
particular instance or not, perhaps being offered a discount on the purchase or some other
incentive if the restriction on linking is lifted. In the event that a Do Not Link ID number
is present but not verified, the store could have the option of deciding whether to go
ahead and link the purchases with the customer's identity, or to recognize the customer's
intent and desire not to be linked and therefore not attempt to do so.
Once the allowance or disallowance of linkage is determined, the process of credit
card purchase authorization would operate similar to current methods. Leaving the
portion of the transaction requiring authorization of the credit card purchase itself until
after determining whether linking is allowed appears less complicated than trying to fit
this into the process at the outset. Also, placing the credit card authorization first does not
allow for application of discounts towards the purchase amount, as the amount has
already been approved.

6.3.2.3 Option 3: "Opting-Out" But "Opting-In" When Desired by the
Individual: Identity Checking at Registration by the Registry
,

This option operates nearly the same way as much of option 2. However, this

option differs in that it provides choices for verifying the identity of an individual at the
time of registration, rather than at the time of the transaction.

6.3.2.3.1 Option 3 Registration Process
After the individual has supplied his name and address to a secure registry
website or over the phone, the registrant would be required to provide one or more forms
of identification (e.g. license number or state ID number) before being assigned a unique
ID number by the registry and being prompted to choose a PIN. As with the previous
options, the unique ID and PIN would be stored at the registry and the registrant would
be issued a card. A check of the submitted form of identification would be made before a
card was issued. If the form of identification provided could not be authenticated, then
the unique ID number assigned by the registry would be invalid and subsequently deleted
from the registry. If an attempt were made to use the number, say by providing it to a
credit card company for inclusion on a credit card, when the individual went to use the
card, the registry number would not be recognized and therefore would be of no use to
the individual. This system does not provide a foolproof means of identity verification,
since anyone who obtained the license number of another person for instance, could use
that as a way to register under a false name. Therefore, additional means of verification
are required, although making it a federal crime to register as another individual or

submitting a false form of identification during the registration process might deter
potential violators of the system.
Option 3A: A minimum additional level of verification could be achieved by
charging registrants a nominal fee requiring payment by a credit card linked to the
registrant's name so that a record of the registrant is obtained. This could be implemented
if registering either through a website or by telephoning the registry.
Option 3B: Another option providing a higher level of verification would be to
gather biometric data such as a photo, fingerprint, iris scan or other biological identifier
as part of the registration process. This would make it easier to track down those engaged
in fraudulent registrations. Biometric data could be collected at a public office, perhaps at
the Department of Motor Vehicles. At the time a driver's license is issued or renewed, the
form might include a question as to whether a person would like to register on the Do Not
Link list. Alternatively, a separate form specifically for registering on the list could be
available. Collecting a digital photo is normally part of the driver licensing process. To
enhance verification of identity in order to better enforce information privacy protection
an additional identifier such as a thumbprint might be advisable and would not unduly
slow down the process. In fact, collection of a thumbprint has been a requirement in
Georgia since 2000.
With the requirement for the collection and storage of biometric data, questions
arise as to where the data would be stored and who might have access to the data, both
presently and in the future. People are generally wary of potential access to databases
containing their personal information, whether by governmental entities for possible
surveillance purposes or by identity thieves, but may be even more concerned if

biometric data were included within the database. The biometric data could be stored
within the registry, along with an individual's registry number and PIN. Wherever the
data ,collection took place, the data would then need to be transferred to the registry.
Security measures for protecting the database and the biometric data transfer would be
necessary. Currently research is being conducted to develop algorithms to protect
biometric data such as fingerprints, facial images, and iris scans from unauthorized
replication and use (Biever 2006).

6.3.2.3.2 Option 3 Transaction Process

For both options 3A and 3B, the individual would swipe her registry card or her
credit card containing her registry number at the start of the transaction process as
previously outlined in options 1 and 2. After entering her PIN, her registry number and
PIN would be sent to the registry to verify that she is on the registry list. If on the list,
then linking of her personal identity to the RFID-tagged items being purchased would not
be allowed. The individual would have the opportunity to allow linking in exchange for
possible discounts. After determination of the allowance or disallowance of linking at the
option of the purchaser, the typical credit card transaction authorization process would
proceed as usual.

6.3.2.4 Option 4: "Opting-Out" But "Opting-In" When Desired by the
Individual: Relying on Identity Checking at Registration by Credit Card
,

Companies
Under the three previous options a person in effect is registering himself or his

identity, with the unique ID number being the means of checking whether he is in the
registry. Option 4A requires that a financial transaction occur in the registration process
thereby requiring that the person registering has already met the identity requirements of
a financial institution. Option 4B involves the added ability of a person to register his
credit card or debit card numbers with the registry.

6.3.2.4.1 Option 4 Registration Process
Option 4A: A person would provide his name, address, and if desired, one form of
identification in a web form or over the phone to verify his identity at the beginning of
the process. He would be assigned a unique ID for the registry and could choose a PIN. A
minimum additional level of identity verification would be provided by requiring the
charge of a fee to a credit card linked to the registrant's name, as outlined in option 3A. If
a higher level of verification was desired, as stated in option 3B, biometric data could be
gathered at the time of registration, but this should probably require an in-person visit to a
physical office to minimize fraudulent identity generation activities. It might be best to
avoid mandating additional security under this option and rely on the security
mechanisms that credit card companies already use. If security measures are already
sufficient for financial transactions, the envisioned system could simply rely on those

same security measures for identifying persons in order to better enforce their privacy
desires.
Option 4B: While a person would still be required to enter his name, address and
one form of identification to verify his identity during the registration process and to
receive a unique registry number, he could also then enter his credit card or debit card
numbers. After he was assigned a unique ID number, he could then choose a PIN. The
unique ID would still be necessary as it would allow him to access the registry to update
his account, whether to add or delete credit card or debit card numbers, or perhaps change
his address, and the PIN would provide an additional security measure. Security for this
registry system would need to be more robust than for some of the previous options, since
accessing a person's registry account would lead to obtaining actual credit card numbers,
enabling identity theft. Maintenance of records about multiple credit card numbers would
also pose a heavy burden on both the registrant and the registry. This option puts a
burden on the consumer to keep updating the registry when he acquires new or drops old
credit and debit cards. Because of the increased management burden on both credit card
users and credit card companies, and increased complexity over a single identifier for
those desiring identity protection, option 4B is not recommended.

6.3.2.4.2 Option 4 Transaction Process
Under option 4A, it is now known that the person registering is highly likely to be
that person in fact, and the unique ID correlation is appropriate. Under this option the
burden might remain on the business to determine if the client has a Do Not Link ID
number and to respect her preference if she does (i.e. transaction processes under options

2 or 3.) AIternatively the burden might be placed on credit card companies to check the
registry for their card holders, respect the Do Not Link requirements, and convey to
businesses at the time of transactions that the card holder can't have purchase items
linked without permission. In this alternative approach the burden of checking the
registry falls upon the credit card companies or banks issuing debit cards. This could be
part of the regular credit card authorization process that is currently impIemented at the
time of purchase. If checking for inclusion on the Do Not Link list was checked at a
remote location during every transaction, it would be an extra step in addition to
verifying that the card was valid and that the person had not gone over her credit limit.
If the burden is put on the credit card companies to check the registry, a registry
card may not be necessary. However, if no registry card is used there must be some way
to inform the store where the purchase is taking place that no linking is allowed. The
responsibility for this could be placed on the credit card companies. This might be
accomplished through sending a message (i.e. card holder's Do IVot Link ID number) to
the store along with the credit card authorization approval. Alternatively the Do Not Link
ID might be included directly on the credit card.
When an individual applies for a new credit card she could be given the option of
supplying to the credit card company her registry ID number. Credit card companies
would probably want to do this as a matter of course to speed up the transaction process
as a benefit for their clients. The credit card company could then include that ID number
on the credit card itself, after verifying that the individual was indeed registered on the
Do Not Link list. After swiping her credit card at the time of purchase, she would be
prompted to enter her Do Not Link PIN. These numbers would be transmitted to the

credit card verification site. If the PIN is correct, the credit card authorization site would
transmit this data back to the store. The individual would then be prompted for a decision
on whether she will grant permission to link her identity with the WID-tagged items in
this instance for some type of discount. If she allows linking, the discount is applied to
the purchase amount, the credit card verification site is contacted to authorize the amount
of transaction and informed that linking can occur, authorization verification is
transmitted back to the store, and both the store and credit card company link the RFIDlabeled items to her identity.

6.3.2.5 Potential Benefits and Issues Raised
With implementation of a Do Not Link Registry, no linking of tag data to a
person's name occurs at the time of purchase without the person's explicit permission.
Therefore, in many cases it would not be possible for RFID readers dispersed throughout
the environment, such as those located on street corners or building entrances, to link the
tag IDS of items to a person. That is, no person is on record as having purchased the
specific items being recognized. However, the possibility of combining RFID with other
technology, such as surveillance cameras, does exist and could allow the linking of
individual identity with specific tag IDS. Again, however, if face recognition software
indicated that a specific person was affiliated with a specific tag at a specific time, that
association could not be linked legally if the person so identified has registered with the
Do Not Link list. One issue then is how to inform the database that the individual
recognized through face recognition, through the license plate of his car, or some other
evidence is on the list. Perhaps an individual could carry a device that could either

continuously broadcast his registry ID number or transmit that number when a RFID
reader is detected. As consumers may not wish to have their registry numbers broadcast,
transmission of another code number or message might be possible. So when the message
reached the database along with the tag data, the database would be informed that no
linking of the individual's name to the tag IDS was allowed.
Perhaps every Do Not Link Registry card issued, or alternatively credit cards or
driver's licenses as previously discussed, should itself carry a passive "privacy RFID"
that responds with a Do Not Link number when applicable. Legislation could make it
illegal to link other RFIDs to the person with the "privacy RFID" without that person's
permission even if that person was identified through other means. The law would be
applied to the commercial and private party sectors with waivers under appropriate
circumstances for law enforcement.
Another possibility is use of a carried or worn item containing a RFID tag that
when scanned by the reader in effect "blanks out" the electronic space around the
surveillance camera. So while the person was within a certain distance of the camera, the
W I D reader could not scan any other RFID tags, whether prevented perhaps by jamming
the signal or through means of some type of blocker tag, examples of which were
discussed in chapter 5. However, chances are that use of this type of an item would be
legally prohibited, or at least heavily protested, as it might enable criminals to commit
crimes with less possibility of detection. Various other approaches for preventing the
recording of tag data by RFID readers have been proposed, such as putting tags in a
"sleep" mode so that no tags affiliated with an individual will respond to a reader or
programming the tags so that they will only respond to specific reader requests (Intermec

2005). However, many of these approaches require some change to RFID technology,
which is a methodology not pursued in this work.
Already discussed was .the possibility of linking a person's identity to previously
unlinked tag ID numbers if the person was identified through face recognition software
utilized by a surveillance camera with a built-in W I D reader. Conversely, if the tag ID
numbers were already linked to the individual, a digital image captured by a camera
could then be linked to the individual's identity. This could pose additional privacy
concerns as it might increase the potential for personal tracking. However, one beneficial
application might be to aid in the identification of criminals. If law enforcement
personnel were unable to identify a suspect viewed in a crime scene surveillance video
through face recognition software, perhaps due to the wearing of a mask by the suspect,
the recorded tag ID numbers from items the individual was wearing or carrying might
allow identification, provided the tags were linked to an identity. Even if the tags were
not linked to a specific identity, having the tag ID numbers might allow law enforcement
to ascertain where the individual had traveled after leaving the crime scene. For instance,
if police believed a suspect might flee the area, readers placed at airport or bus station
entrances, or at toll booths at highway entrances, could be used to determine whether and
at what time the suspect had passed that way.
Another scenario involves the identification by the W I D reader of one or more
tags that were linked to a person's identity at the time of purchase. There needs to be a
way to ensure the additional tags on his person are not now linked to his identity as well.
One possible way of dealing with the situation where a person had previously "opted-in"
so that one or more of the tags currently on his person were linked to his name in a

database, would be for that database to also link his registry ID number to the RFID tag
IDS previously linked to his name. That way when the tag ID number currently being
scanned by the RFID reader reached the database level, it would be known that the other
tags on his person should not be linked to his identity. Questions arise as to whether such
a database of RFID tag information will exist in the future, and if so, who will have
access to this database. The EPCglobal Network is a system being set up with the goal of
connecting servers holding information relating to EPC RFID-tagged items. As part of
the network, the ONS could be queried for the IP address of information relating to a
particular tag's EPC number. The information would be available to trading partners
within the network (EPCglobal 2004). Since through this network, data could be shared
with other business entities and would be accessible through the Internet, the possibility
of widespread access to a tagged item's history and last known location exists. Although
sharing of the data contained within the network may initially be limited to business
partners, the question of who potentially will be able to access the network in the future
should be addressed, as data collected for one purpose is often used for many other
purposes or shared with other entities at a later date, perhaps among those who later form
business alliances.
If an individual chooses to allow no linking by others of tag data to his name, he
may not be able to link his identity to a RFID tag's unique ID at a later date. This might
affect a person's ability to reliably prove a particular item belonged to him in the event
that the tagged item was stolen and later recovered. However, if the linking by others of
tag IDS to a person were banned, the tags would still be useful for most purposes to which
one wanted to put them. For example, if an individual had a personal RFID reader in his

home he could still read the tags of items in his pantry, refrigerator, and closet. His
identity does not need to be linked to the specific jar of peanut butter for him to take an
inventory of his pantry. Also, since the person would have the ability to read his own tags
at any time he desired, he could record the tag IDS of various items, perhaps to inventory
his possessions for insurance purposes. Thus the shortcoming of not being able to tie an
object to himself is readily overcome by taking an automated inventory of all his
possessions through use of an RFID reader and keeping the resulting inventory in a
secure place, whether lockbox, his sister's freezer, or his brother's external hard drive.
One major benefit of a Do Not Link Registry approach to privacy is that it would
not require any change to the RFID technology itself. This is important since
modifications to technology after implementation are often costly in terms of both time
and money. Likewise, future developments in RFID technology should not prevent
implementation of the Do Not Link Registry.
Another benefit is that the registry would provide a legal basis for compliance and
action against violators of the regulations. In order to take action against violators, one
would need to realize that a violation had occurred. Perhaps one way to recognize the
occurrence of linking would be if a person received a special "Welcome Mary Smith"
message or a discount offer as she walked by a store. Mary may know that she has never
allowed any of her purchases to be linked. However, even if the store checked and found
Mary to be on the Do Not Link list, they would be allowed to assume that she may have
opted to allow some items to be tracked and therefore the store appears to be doing
nothing wrong from its perspective. It may be difficult for Mary to identify and prove
who specifically was responsible for linking her RFID tag data to her identity in the first

place. One possibility is for individuals or investigators to record where items are
purchased, perhaps by scanning the RFID tags in the items with a personal RFID reader,
then,downloading the tags' ID numbers to a personal computer and storing them with the
purchase locations. Then if identifying greetings or discounts based on profile were
offered, she could use the knowledge of where the items she was wearing or carrying
were purchased to go after specific companies. Pursuing violations could lead to
subpoenas of suspect databases and massive claims against corporations, which might
prove to be a large deterrent to potential commercial offenders.
Linking the tag to an identity may have occurred at a time after purchase, which
potentially could be dealt with through scan logs - recording all RFID reader scans on a
portable device such as a cell phone (Reiback et al. 2005). The device might require the
use of a "tag emulator" such as has been developed at the MIT Auto-ID lab. The "tag
emulator" would act like a tag, listening and decoding reader communications, so that
these could be recorded (Reiback et al. 2005). Currently the reader-to-tag protocol does
not include a reader ID or a data collector ID, necessary for knowing who is collecting
and recording the tag data. As discussed in section 5.3.1, Floerkemeier et al. (2004)
propose inserting these into the protocol, along with other data. Then the individual could
have a record of who has been collecting data. These scan logs could be downloaded to a
home computer.
A number of issues arise in identifying violators through the recording of scan
logs. Firstly, these scan logs would involve recording and storing a huge amount of data
if readers were to saturate the daily environment. It would probably be necessary to
download the scan logs every day, depending on the storage capacity of the portable

device, which would be inconvenient. Storage of the daily scans on a home computer
might also consume a large amount of memory. Secondly, to include a reader ID and a
data, collector ID in the reader-to-tag protocol would require a change to current W I D
standards and possibly necessitate the registration of readers, perhaps imposed through
legal requirements. Standards committees may be reluctant to include these IDS absent a
law compelling them to do so. Thirdly, the individual would have the problem of
searching through all her records to figure out when the linking took place and by whom.
A person would have to record what she wore each day and store that data along with the
scan logs. Then she would have to search her records to determine the days on which she
wore the same tags as the day she was offered a discount or through some event became
aware that linking to her identity had occurred. In the end a person may not be able to
prove that a specific entity linked a tag to her identity, but only that a scan of the tag data
occurred at specific times and locations and who initiated the scans. However, an
investigator looking for widespread abuses by corporate entities in order to pursue class
action suits would probably be able to accumulate a preponderance of evidence to make
their case without an overly heavy investigative burden.

6.3.2.6 Recommendations

The chosen recommendations not only provide an individual the ability to "optout" of the linking of his identity to specific RFID tags, they also afford him the
opportunity to "opt-in" when he so desires. Additionally, they include a verification of
identity at the outset of the registration process, limiting the potential for registering
under false identities. Integration of a law disallowing the linking of an individual's name

to items he has purchased, or linking his name to RFID-tagged items observed on his
person, provides a legal foundation for the registry that allows action against violations of
the law.

6.3.2.6.1 Registration Process Recommendation

Based on the material outlined in the above sections, it appears that registration
option 4A would work the best from both technological efficiency and practical
perspectives, in order to facilitate the most widespread use of the registry. Verification of
identity at the time of registration provides a safeguard against false registrations and
could either be implemented at a minimal level through requirement of a nominal fee
charged to a credit card linked to the registrant's name, or a higher level through the
collection and recording of the registrant's biometric data. When considering which level
would be deemed acceptable by the majority, there is a tradeoff between ease of
registration access and a more secure system to verify identity. The minimal level of
verification provides easier access. Individuals could register on a website or telephone
the registry at their convenience if the only verification required was a credit card charge
with a match of first and last names in the registry with a match of first and last names on
the credit card. A requirement to travel to a specific location such as a public office (e.g.
DMV) could prove difficult for some individuals and would involve a greater time
commitment.
The level of difficulty and the time required for registering on the Do Not Link
list would no doubt influence the number of individuals who chose to register. However,
providing the option of registering at a public office would give individuals who do not

have a credit card with which to register online or over the phone the ability to register in
person through presentation of one or more forms of identification. Also, individuals with
a greater concern for identity verification may prefer the use of biometric identifiers such
as a photograph or fingerprint. However, there is also a need to balance a high level of
identity verification with concern over storage of and access to biometric data, data that
would be very enticing to identity thieves. Additionally, a system incorporating biometric
data would involve more complexity in system architecture, as the biometric data would
need to be collected and then transmitted to the registry in a secure manner. The cost of
purchasing and installing data collection equipment into a public office would no doubt
be quite high, in addition to the cost of training equipment operators and maintenance of
the equipment, hardware and software. Therefore, designating the DMV as a potential
biometric data collection site seems reasonable, since most if not all of those offices
already have the equipment to collect at least one form of biometric data (e.g. digital
photo).
The chosen approach should attempt to provide the best option for the majority
while allowing personal choice when possible. Ease of access to registration is perhaps in
the best interest of individuals. Therefore, identity verification through requiring a credit
card transaction at registration may be the best approach, if a choice has to be made of
one approach over the other. It is after all credit card transactions rather than cash
transactions that allow most linking to occur, and thus parties with credit cards already
are those who would be most interested in registering. Increased use of biometrics would
be best incorporated by allowing Do IVot Link registrations to be incorporated as part of
the state driver's license application and renewal processes. Due to the less complex

nature of identity verification by credit card transaction validation, beginning with this
approach seems reasonable, with the goal of adding other options later on, such as
allowing the capture of biometric data if individuals so desire. Also to be implemented is
a means of ensuring that all individuals, whether possessing credit cards and drivers'
licenses or not, have access to the registration process. An example of the website
registration form for the recommended Do Not Link registration process is illustrated in
Figure 1.

National Do Not Link Registry
Those supplying false or misleading information will be in violation of a federal offense
and subject to the full prosecution o f the law (U.S. Code xxxx)

The Do Not Link Registry provides you with a computer readable identification number and
identification card that places businesses and government agencies on notice that they may not
link your identity to products containing radio frequency identification tags without your explicit
permission.
To register you must enter the following information:
First name:
Middle name:
Last name:
Address line 1
Address line 2
City:
State:
Zip code:
Email address*:
*An email address is collected so that a confirmation of your registration may be sent to you via email
within 24 hours. If you do not receive an email confirming your registration within that time period, contact
us at help@DoNotLink.orgor by calling us toll-free at xxxx.
Please provide at least one form of ID**:
Driver's license number
State I.D. number
Passport number
**Provision of this form of ID is optional. It is an additional means of verifying identity at the
time of registration, if desired by the registrant.

Figure 1. Website form for recommended D o Not Link registration process.

Credit card information:
A fee of $5 will be charged to your credit card as part of the registration process. The credit card
used must be in your own name. Use your name below exactly as it appears on your credit card.
The first and last name below may NOT be different from that listed above.

First name:
Middle name:

1

Last name:
Address line 1
Address line 2
City:
State:
Zip code:

Type of card:

Credit card number:

r
0
0
0
0

Visa
Mastercard

D'Iscover
American Express

c

Expiration date:

0

I agree to pay the $5 charge required to process my registration.

0

I certify that to the best of my knowledge all information provided on this form is
accurate and does not contain any falsehoods or misrepresentations. Further, I grant
permission for registry officials to verify that the form of identification I provided is
legitimate. I understand that supplying false information or misrepresenting my true
identity may lead to fines andlor criminal charges.

1
Submit

Figure 1 (cont.). Website form for recommended Do Not Link registration process.

6.3.2.6.2 Transaction Process Recommendation
Option 4 provides the best choice for transaction process as well. Under this
option every business would be responsible for making sure that no linking to individuals
in the registry occurs without their explicit permission. This would incentivize businesses
to make the "opt-inn/"opt-out" process efficient.
It seems appropriate to require businesses to check whether or not a person is on
the Do Not Link list, as businesses are the ones actually collecting the data at the point of
sale. This of course would only be efficient if done in a completely automated fashion.
Imposing the requirement would force the process to become efficient. Even though all
stores would be bound legally to enforce the Do Not Link Registry requirements, the
credit card companies may find it more efficient to embed Do Not Link numbers in their
cards and do this checking as part of the automated transaction process. Ultimately, credit
card companies, stores, and all other parties would be bound by the Do Not Link Registry
list. If one of these entities is unwilling to share who is or who is not on the Do Not Link
list with the other entities, each entity would be responsible for checking the registry
independently. The market would eventually arrive at a solution among credit card
companies and retail stores. An action flowchart of how the recommended transaction
process would proceed is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Action flowchart of recommended transaction process.

6.4 Contractual Approach to Autonomous Location Privacy Protection
Autonomy would mean that individuals had options as to how they desired their
personal information to be handled, so as to gain control over that information. To
provide those choices or options in a location-based service context, Bhaduri and Onsrud
(2002) propose the application of a universal contract model that puts control over release
of personal location information into the hands of an individual (Bhaduri 2003). The
theory is that a market solution that allows users to choose and readily alter their privacy
preferences under continually changing circumstances will be more successful in the
market than location services that don't offer this capability. Herein proposed is the
extension of that concept to a RFID environment, allowing individuals who have
registered in the Do Not Link Registry to temporarily "opt-in" to RFID data collection
when they desire to do so, and under what standard contract conditions they desire.
A market solution might be based on incentives, such as if an individual allows

personal tracking in exchange for discounts on goods or services. By permitting an
individual to decide whether and to what extent to allow tracking, this places the
obligation for protecting privacy on the individual, but also empowers the individual with
autonomy to decide. Since the universal contract model would promote the achievement
of each individual's personal preferences, people would likely choose this market
solution over others, resulting in a market that naturally gravitates towards an
environment that would protect privacy responsive to the comfort level of each
individual.

6.4.1 "Opting-In" On-The-Ply: Considerations for System Design
In order for this on-the-fly system to function efficiently in providing privacy
protection, a universal contract model needs to be developed. A contract lays out the
rights and responsibilities of all parties involved. In this case, it is the rights of the
individual consumer and the rights of the business (e.g. grocery store) or the provider of
some service. Use of a contract would facilitate growth within the industry as individuals
would be more apt to "opt-in" if they knew they had some legal recourse if the contract
was breached. A uniform contract employed across industry would allow for easier
integration of services between various business entities and their customers.
Additionally, there would be less confusion for individuals as they would not have to
keep track of numerous contracts with varying structures.
When considering contract parameters, one issue to be addressed regards the
length of time data could be stored. If an individual "opted-in" for a specific service or
discount, would the data collected be stored temporarily or retained for all time?
Incorporated in the Do Not Link enabling legislation might be a provision stipulating that
the link of a RFID tag to a name was to be expunged after a certain time period or
perhaps after a service was completed, unless the Do Not Link registered user explicitly
agreed to a different time period. Perhaps the standard industry contract could also allow
the consumer to change her retention length preferences on a daily basis.
In the grocery store scenario where a customer is purchasing goods, a contract
with default settings might apply when the customer agrees to "opt-in" for a discount on
the purchased goods. However, when signing up for some type of service there could be
more opportunity to create a contract specifying one's preferences. In this case, one

might make decisions not only on the length of data retention, but what data could be
collected, and the purpose to which it could be put. If the consumer is given the ability to
set and, change her preferences as she so desires, the core ethical principle of individual
autonomy is supported.

6.4.2 "Opting-In" for Services
Myriad applications are envisioned for RFID technology. Previously discussed
was the scenario of "opting-in" for discounts at the grocery store. "Opting-in" for
services is another possibility. One proposed service involves providing information to
the user based on location of personal belongings, such as reminding the user not to leave
her umbrella on the train, or informing her of where she can find a taxi or bus at the train
station through use of an RFID enabled cellular phone with Internet access (Shimizu et
al. 2005). The potential applications for RFID technology appear endless. However, with
the creation of a Do Not Link Registry, along with laws limiting RFID data linking and
the ability of individuals to "opt-in" for services or discounts, privacy protection that
facilitates personal choice may be possible even in a RFID laden environment.

Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

This thesis highlights the problem of privacy loss within a milieu of ever
expanding surveillance and tracking technologies, examines privacy protection methods
proposed by others, and presents a recommended approach to personal privacy protection
within a pervasive RFID environment. The recommended approach merges both legal
and technological means of privacy protection, enabling individual control over the
decision of whether or not to allow linking of RFID tag data to personal identity. This
chapter provides a thesis summary, discusses the conclusions reached, and outlines
potential future work.

7.1 Summary
Privacy has become a matter of great concern to individuals, especially in light of
the many recent data privacy breaches involving the records of data warehouses, credit
card companies, or other entities. Although surveillance technologies have become a
common element of daily life, their increasing capacity to track when an individual is at a
specific location and even what she bought at that location, has heightened concerns over
privacy. Moreover, RFID technology could facilitate the continuous tracking of
individuals through the RFID-tagged items they are wearing or carrying, and that data
could be merged with other personal information, raising the potential privacy threat
level to a new high.

In order to lay the foundation for a discussion of privacy and the pursuit of a
solution for preventing privacy loss, this thesis defined privacy from various perspectives
and presented issues relating to privacy both in general aspects and specifically to
location-based privacy. An examination was made of proposed methods of protecting
privacy through both legal and teclmological means.
To find a privacy solution within RFID environments, one must first understand
the technology. Therefore, the components of a RFID system and the operation of a RFID
system were covered. A discussion was provided on the privacy issues relating to RFID
technology and how they differ from issues arising through use of other technologies. A
discussion was also included on how current and future uses of W I D technology raise
specific concerns relating to privacy.
As legal or technological approaches on their own do not provide a total solution
to privacy protection, a better solution may be reached by combining these approaches
through a contractual relationship between data collectors and consumers, with
technology designed to enforce the contract. By allowing consumers to contract with data
collectors as to how much or when data may be collected, they have the option of setting
their own privacy preferences, thus promoting individual autonomy.
The privacy protection model presented in this thesis allows consumers to choose
whether they want the RFID tags embedded in items they purchase to be linked to their
identities. The opportunity to register on a centralized list that provides notice of an
individual's desire not to have this linking take place, legally supported through privacy
law, would provide this choice for consumers. At the same time, if a consumer chose to
"opt-in" for a particular benefit, this option would be available to him, enabled through

private contract with a particular business or service provider, supporting the principle of
autonomy by allowing the consumer to choose his own privacy preferences.
Technological means of implementing this system and potential issues arising from
implementation were also addressed.
Since it is impossible to foresee exactly what advancements in RFID and other
computing technology will be reached at the time when full-scale RFID adoption occurs,
this research was conducted under the following assumptions:
Most or all consumer products will be embedded with RFID tags.
A pervasive system of W I D readers will exist.
Data from RFID tags can be linked to personal identity.
RFID systems will be interoperable, allowing continuous tracking of tags.
RFID technology will remain a fairly open system, facilitating access to
most passive RFID tags by any RFID reader.

7.2 Conclusions
The goal of this thesis was to explore whether an approach could be conceptualized
that might sufficiently protect individual privacy in the use of RFID technologies while
simultaneously supporting a marketplace environment that would foster expansion of
innovative RFID applications. Bearing in mind the assumptions listed in the previous
section, several questions were posed in chapter 1 and investigated and analyzed through
the course of this research. These questions are restated below, and are followed by the
conclusions drawn.

What is the minimum standard of privacy protection that would prove acceptable
to the general populace and how could technology be used to enforce that level of
protection?
This research exposed that minimum levels of privacy comfort vary
among individuals, as well as over time as circumstances change. Thus minimum
levels of comfort need to be responsive to individual choice. By examining both
past and current legal and technological proposals for privacy protection, an
approach was developed based on individual choice. While the model gives
individuals autonomy to choose, it is also makes them responsible for intelligently
protecting their own privacy if they value it. Legal protections in the form of
privacy legislation are included in the proposed approach, supporting choice.
By incorporating this privacy protection method into the purchase
transaction process, consumers are allowed to prevent the linking of tag data at
the outset of their relationship with an RFID-labeled object. The current
technology that is set up for credit card transaction authorization provides the type
of architecture required for businesses and other service providers to validate the
registry PIN number that customers provide by swiping their credit cards or
registry cards at the time of RFID-tagged item purchases. Since current
technology can be utilized, successful implementation of the recommended
approach appears to be realistic. As technology advances, technological
alterations are readily envisioned as capable of being incorporated into system
design and operation.

How might purchasers ofRFID-tagged items be afforded control over the amount
and nature ofpersonal or location information that may be obtained through the
recording and tracking oftheir tags by RFID readers?
The Do Not Link Registry provides consumers the ability to effectively
"opt-out" of the linking of W I D tag data to other personally identifiable
information. This centralized list approach has been successfully implemented
through the National Do Not Call Registry and the legal approach recommended
appears to be clearly supported by past constitutional case law.
The approach proposed in this thesis enables consumers who have
registered on the list to "opt-in" when they so choose through a standard industrywide form contract approach defining the legal relationships between all
businesses using RFID tags and all consumers choosing to register on the Do Not
Link list. The standard contract would enable consumers to limit tag data
collection according to their privacy preferences and to change their preferences
over time as desired.

How could unauthorized linking of RFID tag data to individual identities be
prevented?
One instance for potential linking might arise when a reader detects on a
person several tags that were linked to the person's identity in the past when the
person "opted-in" to linking. In this case, once the W I D tag data reached the
database, notification that no linking is allowed would be provided since at the
time of purchase the person's registry ID number was stored along with the
purchaser's name and the item's unique identifier.

Linking of tag IDS to personal identity may be possible through the
combination of a RFID reader and a surveillance camera. If a person was
identified through use of an alternative method, this could be dealt with by means
of carrying a Do Not Link Registry card that was embedded with a "privacy
RFID" responding to RFID readers with the person's Do Not Link ID number,
providing notification that no linking was allowed. The Do Not Link enabling
legislation could make linking other W I D s to a person with a "privacy RFID"
illegal, if done without explicit permission.
Absolute prevention of linking may not be possible without the use of
technology such as a RFID signal jamming device or a blocker tag, as previously
discussed. However, by enacting legislation stating that individuals registered on
the Do Not Link list may not have their names linked to RFID embedded items
they purchase without granting explicit permission, a legal basis for action against
violators of the laws is provided. These individuals would be subject to civil
lawsuits for actual or statutory damages, which should provide a deterrent to
potential offenders.

Since a multitude of consumer RFID applications are envisioned for the future,
how might privacy be enabled in a way that permits continued tag usability after
the purchase of RFID-tagged goods?
As modifications to tag technology involves both time and monetary costs,
the proposed approach strove to provide privacy protection that did not involve
any alterations to RFID tags. Therefore, tags will still retain their usability after
purchase, whether utilized in the home environment or for applications outside the

home. If the combined technological and legal model recommended through this
research were implemented, it might drive RFID tag developments in a direction
where legal privacy protections were enforced automatically.

How might consumer privacy protection be facilitated, while at the same time not
hindering the growth of useful RFID applications and the RFID market?
The Do Not Link Registry provides a means to "opt-out" of the linking of
personal identity to RFID-tagged items. The "opt-in" capability enabled through
the universal private contract approach allows even those who would otherwise
not allow linking to "opt-in" when they wish to receive some type of benefit or
for a desired service. If no information privacy protections are provided, the
market is likely to experience wide-ranging destructive counter technologies that
will have a disruptive affect on the market. Since it is in the best interest of
businesses and service providers to have access to RFID data, this will
undoubtedly lead to the development of applications and services that incorporate
individual choice in the setting of privacy preferences and allow users to alter
their preferences easily and at any time.

The conclusions outlined above support the hypothesis of this thesis, and it is thus
ultimately concluded:
A combined legal and technological approach has greater potential for

sufficiently protecting individual privacy in the use of RFID technologies
while also strongly supporting marketplace uses of such tags than would
use of technological or legal solutions alone.

7.3 Future Work
RFID is a rapidly advancing field of technology. Abundant research is currently
being conducted in many aspects of this field, such as improved tag functionality through
increased microchip computing power and storage capacity, greater read range,
commonality of RFID operational standards, applications of RFID technology, and
privacy protection. In addressing RFID and privacy issues, this thesis research has
discovered additional avenues for future work. The following sections address areas that
extend this research specifically, in addition to suggesting other areas of related research.

7.3.1 Extensions of Proposed Approach
This research presents a conceptual model of privacy protection - lays out the
model components, presents various options for system architecture, recommends one
option to pursue, and discusses potential issues resulting from system implementation.
Actual implementation of the proposed model was not within the scope of this research.
In order to implement the model, further attention needs to be focused on the specific
components of the model.

7.3.1.1 Registry Oversight
In considering implementation of the Do Not Link Registry, the question arises of
which type of entity should be responsible for overseeing the system. Two possibilities
are a government agency or a non-profit organization. As U.S. citizens are cognizant of
recent domestic spying programs, trust in governmental oversight of personal information
has diminished for some individuals, and they may prefer oversight by a non-profit

organization. Conversely, other individuals may feel the government should be the
institution overseeing such a program. Determination of which type of oversight would
be preferred and trusted by the majority would help ensure that the registry was used by
the largest number of individuals. If people feel they cannot trust the system, they will be
wary of using it.

7.3.1.2 Contract Development

Consideration needs to be given to development of the universal contract that is
used when individuals who have registered on the Do Not Link list decide to "opt-in" to
linking in a specific instance. This contract would be in force between the consumer and
the data collector. Contract design should take into account the needs and desires of
individual users. Therefore, consideration should be given to questions such as:
What privacy settings would individuals desire?
Using those settings, how could the contract be developed so as to allow users to
readily select and change their preferences?
How would data collectors be held accountable for the misuse of data collected?
How could industry be incentivized for model acceptance?
Whichever contract design is chosen, the design needs to be flexible to accommodate
multiple user preferences and support dynamically changing contract parameters
(Bhaduri 2003).

7.3.1.3 Legislation
Privacy legislation would provide the strength to the Do Not Link Registry,
allowing investigation of and action against violators of the law. Creating legislation is
generally a difficult and a time-consuming task. In this case, with legislation requiring
incorporation of RFID technology, it may prove to be an even more complex process and
require considerably more effort to construct, especially because future developments of
the RFID technology are not fully known. Initially, businesses may be inclined to block
passage of such legislation, unless they are able to see the potential benefits and potential
profits.

7.3.1.4 Calculation of Costs
As with implementation of any project, cost becomes a significant issue. Costs
associated with implementation and maintenance of a Do Not Link Registry need to be
calculated and responsibility needs to be assigned for cost coverage. Additionally, to
support the verification process of registry PIN numbers at the time of a purchase,
businesses would need to have the technological capability to perform this function, as
well as ensuring RFID-tagged items are not linked to a person's name in the business'
database if that person is registered on the Do Not Link list. These capabilities would
require the installation of additional hardware and/or software. While larger corporations
may be able to absorb these expenditures more easily, the costs may prove a heavy
burden for smaller stores that would likely be forced to pass these costs on to their
customers. Without the new technology, stores would have to assume that no customers
may have their identities linked to their purchases, thereby giving a distinct advantage to

the larger businesses. However, credit card companies might very well take on the role..
Other costs to be considered include technical costs in terms of additional processing
time for purchase transactions, data storage capacity needs, and security provisions.
Although some of these costs may seem to be quite high when considered only from a
monetary viewpoint, when weighed against the cost to society of not protecting personal
privacy, they may not appear nearly as costly.

7.3.1.5 Security
Security is always a concern when dealing with any type of personal data.
Reliance could be placed on the same security mechanisms that credit card companies
currently employ in the transmission and storage of data. However, due to the sometimes
lax security measures that have led to recent data breaches, a more secure system may be
desired. Outcry from victims of these security breaches may force credit card companies
to develop and implement a higher level of security which could also be applied to the
transmission and storage of registry data. Determination of the required or desired level
of security would need to take into account not only current technological capabilities,
but also attempt to foresee what future security issues might arise, as technology is
advancing at a rapid pace. The appropriate amount of security necessary to employ this
system may depend ultimately on the use to which the registry ID number is put. If at
some time in the future this number is used as a supplement or replacement of a social
security number, then a more robust form of security is desirable, as possession of the
registry ID number may enable access to copious amounts of personal information, as a
social security number does presently.

7.3.2 Another Area of Research
RFID technology provides a rich field of research. Privacy, though only a
relatively small part of the research being conducted in this field, is a very important
aspect of RFID technology. Assuming the technology becomes ubiquitous in the future,
additional privacy concerns will no doubt arise, perhaps with each step towards ubiquity.
Previously discussed in this thesis was the potential for embedding a RFID reader
into a surveillance camera, possibly facilitating the identification of people whose RFIDtagged clothing and other carried items were not currently linked to their individual
names. Additional technologies could be joined with RFID technology. One such
example is combining RFID and GPS, which is already being employed in shipment
tracking. The real-time tracking capabilities of GPS, along with the ability of RFID
technology to link vast amounts of data to a particular tag, and therefore a particular
individual, heightens the threat for a continuous tracking environment. With this potential
to combine RFID with various other technologies comes the need to discuss privacy
issues arising from specific combinations of technology, and to consider potential
solutions to limit privacy loss.
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